



3 1761 11708209 9

CAI
ND800
-79U53

GOVT



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
University of Toronto

<https://archive.org/details/31761117082099>

CAI
ND 800
79453

Government
Publications

**TASK FORCE
ON
REVIEW OF UNIFICATION
OF
THE CANADIAN FORCES**

**FINAL REPORT
15 MARCH 1980**

(3)

**TASK FORCE
ON
REVIEW OF UNIFICATION
OF
THE CANADIAN FORCES**

**FINAL REPORT
15 MARCH 1980**



Task Force on Review
of Unification of the
Canadian Armed Forces

Groupe de travail chargé
d'étudier l'unification des
forces armées canadiennes

TO : MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

In accordance with the direction of the Minister of National Defence, on the 6th September, 1979, to examine the merits and disadvantages of unification of the Canadian Forces, we respectfully submit our report of this review.

G.M. Pyffe
Chairman

Dr. H. Critchley
Member

Dr. A. Legault
Member

Mr. E.A. Olmsted
Member

MGen P.A. Neatby
Member

W.M. Ritchie
Executive Secretary

PREFACE

This review of unification of the Canadian Forces is the product of the best of our collective judgement framed in the context of what we consider to be in the long term interests of the Canadian public and the Canadian Forces.

We wish to extend our sincere appreciation to the Deputy Minister of National Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff, and all members of the Department of National Defence who so willingly and professionally assisted us in carrying out our review.

Our gratitude and appreciation are extended to all individuals and organizations who appeared before the Task Force or submitted briefs to us. Without these extremely valuable inputs we would not have been able to form the judgements and conclusions contained in this report.

Our express thanks are extended to the secretariat for their special efforts and highly competent assistance to the members of the Task Force in completing our assignment.

And finally we take full and exclusive responsibility for the views contained herein.

The Task Force

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I	Introduction	1
SECTION II	"Unification": Reorganization of the Department of National Defence 1964-1968	5
SECTION III	Unification in Context	10
	(A) The Political-Legal Setting	10
	(B) Defence Policy	13
	(C) Defence Budget	19
SECTION IV	Evolution of Unification	26
	(A) Pre-Integration	26
	(B) The Glassco Commission	27
	(C) Integration - 1964-1967	28
	(D) Unification - 1967-1971	30
	(E) Changes - 1972-1979	31
	(F) The Forces Today	33
SECTION V	Summary of Views Expressed to the Task Force	38
	(A) Command and Control	39
	(B) Identity	45
	(C) Support Services	47
	(D) Training	49
	(E) Personnel System	51
	(F) Recruiting	53
	(G) Reserve Force and Cadets	54

SECTION VI	Unification 1979: Problems, Conclusions and Recommendations	56
(A)	Interpretation of the Mandate	56
(B)	1979 Review of Goals of Unification	57
(C)	Problems Identified and Recommendations	61
(i)	Support Services	61
(ii)	Personnel System	63
(iii)	Training	67
(iv)	Recruiting	68
(v)	Base Concept	69
(vi)	Mobilization	71
(vii)	The Reserve Force and Cadets	73
(viii)	Command and Control	75
(ix)	Identity	78
(D)	Conclusion on Operational Effectiveness	81

ANNEXES:

(A)	Guideline for Submission	83
(B)	Schedule: Meetings of the Task Force	84
(C)	Data: Groups and Individuals	98
(D)	Department of National Defence Organization 1963	101
(E)	Department of National Defence Organization 1964	102
(F)	Department of National Defence Organization 1968	103
(G)	Department of National Defence Organization 1979	104
(H)	Consultant's Statement	105
(J)	Staff of the Task Force	106

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

A. MANDATE

The Task Force was formed by the former Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Allan A. McKinnon, on September 6, 1979 with the mandate to examine the merits and disadvantages of unification of the Canadian Forces and at the same time to provide comment on the unified command system. The Minister charged the Task Force to report to him by January 31, 1980. This reporting date was subsequently extended to March 15, 1980, upon representation from the Task Force which cited the widespread interest, the large number of briefs being received and the consequent additional time required for hearings, data assimilation and analysis, and report development and preparation.

B. APPROACH

The Task Force began its work with a review of some of the literature on unification of the Canadian Forces and a series of discussions to arrive at a common understanding of the Minister's mandate in greater detail. The members of the Task Force agreed from the outset on several essential matters.

- a. The Task Force would examine the advantages and disadvantages of unification in the sense of conducting an audit.
- b. Although there is a fine distinction between the integration and unification of the Canadian Forces, the structures and processes which constitute "unification" have been the subject of almost continual change since 1968. Indeed, an evolution has occurred over the 1968-1979 period. The Task Force would conduct its review of unification as it existed at the time of receiving the Minister's mandate, that is, September 1979.
- c. The intended criterion for conducting the audit, drawing conclusions and making recommendations would be the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces in 1979.

There are few formal studies of unification. Documentary and statistical data are scant, and in some cases, of uneven quality or insufficient scope. The Task Force therefore concluded that its approach to meet the mandate would have to rely heavily on gathering individual and collective opinions. While the short time available for conducting the review did not permit a statistically significant sampling of opinion, every effort was made to gather the most comprehensive selection possible. Within this time constraint, emphasis was placed on soliciting the views of officers and other ranks who currently serve in the Canadian Forces. In addition, opinions were sought from individuals who had served in the

Canadian Forces or were associated with the Department of National Defence at some point during the 1964-1979 period, military associations and the Canadian public at large. Information was gathered in both private and public hearings.

Given the size and complexity of the task, the approach chosen and the time constraint on completing the work, the Task Force conclusions and recommendations to the Minister of National Defence would have to take the form of the Task Force's best collective judgement based on the information received and in the context of several general governing principles.

C. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

There is no intent on the part of the Task Force to malign past management of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces. The overriding principle is to apply good collective judgement towards determining what is in the best interests of the Canadian Forces and the Canadian public for the future.

The Department of National Defence is not a public service organization similar to other government departments. Military personnel are not civilians in uniform, nor are they a police force, although they may be called upon occasionally to perform non-military functions and activities as a secondary role. The Task Force recognizes the unique purpose and function of the Canadian Forces. It constitutes an organization whose duty is to protect and defend the security and independence of Canada.

The Regular Force and the Reserve Force are volunteer forces and the Task Force is conscious of this fact in making recommendations aimed at attracting and keeping personnel, who are motivated to serve their country in peace and war, in a force of which they can be justly proud.

The Task Force believes that an operational focus is paramount in meeting those tasks assigned to the Canadian Forces by the Government.

The Task Force approached its mandate in the context of existing defence policy recognizing that there may well be a defence policy review in the near future.

As noted in this report, there has been an evolution of the structure of unification since the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act was proclaimed in 1968. Over the past sixteen years the Canadian Forces has been through a series of upheavals with integration, the rapid implementation of unification, subsequent reorganizations including the establishment of Air Command, and a decline in resources. Medium and long term planning has been influenced by constant uncertainty about the financial resources which would be made available to the Department of National Defence. Therefore, the Task Force believes that any changes must be effected in an evolutionary manner and it is in this vein that the recommendations are framed.

D. INFORMATION SOURCES

The Task Force sought opinions from six distinct groups of people.

The first group consisted mainly of serving general officers and civilian equivalents in National Defence Headquarters from the level of Brigadier-General/Senior Executive Level I. This group included the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Assistant Deputy Ministers as well as Associate Assistant Deputy Ministers, Branch Chiefs and selected individuals at the Director General level.

The second group consisted of officers and other ranks currently serving in the Canadian Forces. This group included: the Commanders of Air Command, Maritime Command (Atlantic and Pacific), Mobile Command, Canadian Forces Europe, Communication Command, Canadian Forces Training System; other general, senior and junior officers; senior and junior non-commissioned officers; and Privates. The Task Force visited the headquarters of each of the above-mentioned commands and seventeen Canadian Forces bases across Canada, in Europe and Cyprus. Ultimately, a body of opinion was collected that ranged across all ranks, officer classifications, and most trades and skill levels. Variations in length of service and environmental backgrounds were also taken into account.

The Task Force visit to a base generally started with a prepared statement by the commander in which he discussed - from the perspective of unification - the benefits, complexities or difficulties in the execution of his tasks. This was followed by a series of group discussions and individual interviews wherein the personal views of a representative selection of officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks were heard on a privileged and confidential basis.

The third group consisted of retired officers. The Task Force decided that this group should include all general officers at the rank level of Major-General and above, as well as selected Brigadier-Generals, who had retired on or after January 1, 1965 from the Canadian Forces or from the former three armed services of Canada. These officers were invited to present a written submission to and/or appear before the Task Force.

The fourth group consisted of specifically invited individuals including former Ministers of National Defence, former Deputy Ministers, former Assistant Deputy Ministers, and others whom the Task Force deemed appropriate.

The fifth group consisted of Canadian associations and organizations which have a continuing interest in the Department of National Defence.

The sixth and final group was the public at large. Based upon the response to public notices, the Task Force held public hearings in six cities across Canada (Halifax, Ottawa, Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver and Victoria) during the eight week period from December 3, 1979 to January 25, 1980.

All members of the public and associations appearing before the Task Force were requested to provide written submissions to the Task Force prior to their appearance and in accordance with a guideline for submission attached as Annex A. All other individuals appearing before the Task Force were invited to prepare a written submission prior to appearance. The Task Force received over 300 solicited and unsolicited written submissions.

Annex B presents the schedule of all hearings held by the Task Force.

The Task Force sponsored two research projects to serve as background for its report: an historical study and a review of the unification debates in the late 1960s. In addition, reference documents and published material were obtained primarily from the Department of National Defence and the Library of Parliament.

Major-General (Retired) R.F. Herbert, CD was appointed by the Minister of National Defence as a consultant to the Task Force to provide advice and guidance on matters pertaining to the air force (a statement relevant to the performance of these duties is attached as Annex H).

The method of information gathering automatically placed an emphasis on individual judgement and perception. To the extent feasible within the time constraints, this was supplemented by research and background information. Individuals appearing before the Task Force numbered 1,110. Of this, well over 900 were currently serving members of the Canadian Forces, representing all rank levels and varying backgrounds. Statistical details are contained in Annex C.

Throughout this report the terms navy, army and air force (uncapitalized) are used for the sake of clarity and in accordance with the present practice of using these terms throughout the Canadian Forces.

SECTION II

"UNIFICATION": REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

1964-1968

The reorganization of Canada's armed forces into a single unified force originated in the early 1960s and became effective on February 1, 1968, after a lengthy legislative process and intense debate.

A. INTEGRATION 1964

Reorganization required two legislative changes. The first, Bill C-90, which was introduced in the House of Commons shortly after the White Paper on Defence became policy in March 1964, amended the National Defence Act by eliminating the three separate Chiefs of Staff and creating a single Defence Staff and a single Chief of the Defence Staff with executive authority over the three services. Bill C-90 came into effect on August 1, 1964. In the first phase under Bill C-90, National Defence Headquarters was reorganized along functional lines that cut across the existing three service organizations as outlined at Annex E. The second phase of the reorganization began in June 1965 with the announcement of a new integrated field command structure which reduced the existing eleven commands in Canada to six: Mobile, Maritime, Air Defence, Air Transport, Materiel and Training (see Commands section of Annexes D and F). As part of this second phase, various bases across the country were reorganized. The command and base organizations were streamlined to reduce overhead and charged with carrying out the defence roles within the resources available and within the context of an integrated, highly mobile force, rather than a force organized in accordance with the traditions of the navy, army and air force.

The first two phases in the reorganization, which encompassed the period 1964-1966, and which were facilitated by Bill C-90, were commonly referred to as "integration", although the 1964 White Paper, which had announced the government's intention to reorganize the armed forces into a "single unified defence force", used the terms integration, unification and reorganization indiscriminately. In 1967 integration was described as:

... the process by which the three Services are brought together under single control and management with common logistics, supply and training systems, operating within a functional command and organizational structure but retaining the legal identities of the three Services and the legal barriers between them.¹

¹Air Marshal F.R. Sharp Testimony, Standing Committee on National Defence, February 7, 1967, p. 462.

B. UNIFICATION 1968

The second legislative change, Bill C-243, was introduced in the House of Commons in November 1966, was passed in April 1967 and became effective on February 1, 1968. Under the provisions of Bill C-243, titled The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, the three existing services, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force, were abolished and Canada's armed forces became a single service called the Canadian Forces. Although the armed forces were already subject to unified control and management, Bill C-243 created one force with one name, a common uniform and common rank designations. This was generally referred to as unification, the last phase in the reorganization process to create a "single unified defence force" which the Government had initiated in 1964.

The Honourable Paul Hellyer, the Minister of National Defence throughout the period of the reorganization, viewed this last phase in the reorganization as the end of a logical, continuous process to create a single unified force.

Unification is the end objective of a logical and evolutionary progression. Although integration and unification are sometimes regarded as alternatives, and inherently different, they are, in fact, merely different stages in the same process. Integration was actually the term applied to the first stages of the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces.²

Given this definition of unification as expressed by the Government's chief spokesman, the difference between integration and unification was essentially legislative.

C. GOALS OF REORGANIZATION

1) Financial Savings

Reorganization would reduce overhead costs to provide more funds for the acquisition of modern operational equipment in keeping with Canada's defence roles and commitments. The duplication and sometimes triplication of functions among the services such as logistics, communications, transport, recruiting, training, pay and finance, personnel administration and building maintenance would be reduced by the creation of a single Canadian Forces Headquarters, functional commands and the base system.

²House of Commons Debates - 27th Parliament, Vol X, p. 10827.

ii) Increased Operational Effectiveness

Canada's armed forces would be able to take advantage of the latest advances in science and technology. This goal recognized the technological developments in modern warfare which cut across traditional service roles and the increasing costs associated with equipping and maintaining a modern military force. A unified force would allow for a more objective assessment of defence technological needs. There would be advantages not only for the operational forces, but also for the support services. Reorganization would allow for modernization of the management processes by introducing computerized systems in logistics, pay and finance, and training which otherwise would not have been available because of insufficient funds.

The operational effectiveness of Canada's armed forces would be increased. The emphasis on top level decision making would be changed in order that policies, plans and decisions concerning defence programs and spending would be made on the basis of Canada's total military needs, rather than on the needs of an individual service. It was felt that with a unified force, the conflicting loyalties and competition among the three services would be decreased thereby providing a more objective analysis and assessment of defence requirements, and ultimately a more effective defence program within a limited budget.

Flexibility of the Canadian Forces would be increased with a unified force. Under the direction of a single Chief of the Defence Staff, military forces would be able to react swiftly either individually or jointly as the situation required. Previously, the Government had to rely on the coordinated response of three separate services. However, a unified force did not imply that the operational units would change. There would still be "brigades, air wings, and squadrons of ships"³ and personnel trained and equipped for these formations. It was held that increased flexibility also implied the requirement for modern weapons and equipment. Their acquisition would be possible with the savings accrued through unification.

Within these broad defence reorganization goals, the Government identified the additional advantages of common identity and improved career opportunities in a unified force, the final phase of reorganization.⁴

³Ibid., p. 10828.

⁴Ibid., p. 10829.

iii) Common Identity

Unification would create a common identity and engender a "higher loyalty beyond that which is given to a particular service",⁵ a loyalty to the entire force and its total objectives on behalf of Canada. It was felt that with a higher loyalty to the Canadian Forces as a whole there would be a more objective analysis and assessment of military operations and requirements. Common identity, through unification, would permit cross-service employment and provide a solution to the problem of representation by service. Particularly in the national headquarters and to some degree in the headquarters of the commands, a large number of staff positions could be filled by officers from a number of career specialties.

iv) Careers

Unification will provide better and fairer employment prospects for Service personnel. Under a system of separate Services, opportunities are naturally limited to the scope, tasks and requirements of the individual Service. An integrated command structure provides some additional outlet, but this is limited, normally, to the senior management level as opposed to the broad opportunities and advantages presented by a single Service.⁶

With unification, career opportunities would be improved by standardized career planning. There would be a broader base from which to "identify, develop and appoint"⁷ the best qualified individuals, as the barriers created by the three services would no longer exist. The anomalies in the separate service personnel policies, which became readily apparent during the integration process, would be overcome. For many specialties and trades, unification would provide a greater interchangeability among the services. With the separate navy, army and air force structures, there were differences in promotional opportunities among the same trades principally because of the unique individual service approach and differences in promotional criteria for commissioning from the ranks. Furthermore there were differences in trades training in spite of earlier integration efforts to recognize the commonality of trades and to reduce the more than three hundred occupational classes to approximately one hundred.

Notwithstanding the movement to a common identity and personnel structure, the Government gave assurances that combat units would retain their identity, specialized functions and training. Servicemen would not become "jacks-of-all-trades".

⁵Ibid., p. 10829.

⁶Ibid., p. 10831.

⁷Ibid., p. 10830.

An infantry soldier will not be asked to do the job of a sailor in a fighting ship; a sailor will not be asked to fight in an infantry platoon; and a fighter pilot will not be required to drive a tank.⁸

In proceeding with the final phase of reorganization which would abolish the three services, the Government stated that this would not necessarily imply an "abandonment of tradition of pride in the unit and other ingredients of esprit de corps".⁹ Traditions for the unified force would be developed upon the traditions of the past. Unification would foster innovation and inject enthusiasm and vigor into the organization. In addition, Canadian servicemen would have the satisfaction of knowing that they were setting the pace for the world by being the first to modernize the organization of military forces.

⁸Ibid., p. 10832.

⁹Ibid., p. 10832.

SECTION III

UNIFICATION IN CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

Four sets of events, which have occurred concurrently over the past fifteen years, have had a major cumulative effect on Canada's armed forces. The four sets of events are: the implementation, first, of integration, then unification; decreases, in real terms, in the defence budget; decreases in authorized military personnel levels; and increases in the number and types of tasks set for the Canadian Forces by the Government. The events took place within a political-legal setting which established the authority and responsibilities of various office holders for the conduct of Canada's defence and two changes in official Canadian defence policy. When the events and setting are combined, they form the larger context for judgements concerning unification as it relates to the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces in 1979. Opinions, as expressed to the Task Force in the form of testimony and written submissions, reflected varying perceptions of this larger context.

Because of the interrelationships among the effects of events, or between events and the larger context, it is difficult to separate the connections between operational effectiveness and unification on the one hand, from the connections between operational effectiveness and increased tasks accompanied by decreased financial and personnel resources, on the other hand. It is the Task Force's view that the political-legal setting, the defence policy and the defence budget components of the larger context require further elaboration in order to facilitate an understanding of these interrelationships and of the general context surrounding unification.

A. THE POLITICAL - LEGAL SETTING

The primacy of civilian control over Canada's armed forces is embedded in the Canadian parliamentary system. As there have been several changes over time in the formal mechanism by which this control has been exercised, only the current political-legal setting will be discussed.

The Governor General, as the Sovereign's representative, has been the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Canada since colonial days.

Parliament exercises its authority and control over the Canadian Forces in a variety of ways. In the first instance, the Cabinet is responsible to Parliament for all matters relating to national defence including decisions on defence policy as well as the provision of personnel and funds for implementing that policy.

Official defence policy is generally set forth in a White Paper, while the defence budget provides for its implementation. At this level, several Cabinet committees may make recommendations on defence matters. Although the exact Cabinet committee titles may vary with the Government of the day, they include the Committee on External Policy and Defence and various other committees such as the Committee on Security and Intelligence. These committees tend to reinforce the Cabinet's role in setting the Government's priorities on defence.

It is at the Cabinet, or Cabinet committee level, that advice on defence matters culminates from a variety of sources. The major sources include the Office of the Prime Minister, the Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board, and the departments of National Defence, External Affairs, Finance, Supply and Services, and Industry, Trade and Commerce. Depending on the issue at hand, the advice of other government departments or agencies may be considered.

On a broader level, defence matters compete with the national concerns of all other agencies and departments represented in the Cabinet. This particular structure reinforces the executive arm of government and facilitates the coordination of broad governmental policies.

The House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence plays an important role, depending on the circumstances, in the discussion of defence matters.

Within the general responsibility of Cabinet for all matters relating to national defence, the Minister of National Defence is specifically responsible to Parliament "for the control and management of the Canadian Forces...and...all matters relating to national defence including preparation for civil defence against enemy action".¹ A single Minister of National Defence was appointed in 1946 and in 1950 the National Defence Act created a single department to administer the Government's decisions relating to defence. The Department was also to apply the same rules of Canadian military law and justice to all members of Canada's armed forces and to introduce a common approach to all other legal aspects of defence.

Some of the more specific powers and responsibilities of the Minister, as set out in the 1950 National Defence Act, have been subject to amendment or repeal from the 1950s on - the most recent being in 1976-77. Other authority and responsibilities for the Minister are derived from such

¹National Defence Act, 1950, Section 3. An amendment to this section of the Act in 1976-77 altered the wording on the Minister's general responsibilities relating to "construction and maintenance of defence establishments and all works for the defence of Canada" and for defence-related research. These amendments reflected certain changes in the internal organization of the department.

statutes, with their later amendments, as the Financial Administration Act (1951), the Public Service Employment Act (1967), and the Aeronautics Act (1919).

The Minister is assisted by two senior advisors: the Deputy Minister is the senior civilian advisor, the Chief of the Defence Staff is the senior military advisor.

The Deputy Minister, whose position resulted from the amalgamation in 1947 of the three Deputy Ministers' organizations of the three separate services, advises the Minister on all departmental affairs of concern or interest to the Government and to governmental agencies such as the Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board and the Public Service Commission. Within the Department of National Defence, the Deputy Minister is responsible for ensuring that all policy direction emanating from the Government is reflected in the administration of the Department and in military plans and operations.

Although the National Defence Act (1950, Section 7(1)) mentions the Deputy Minister, the holder of this office actually derives his authority and responsibilities from other statutes. The 1967 Interpretation Act (Section 23(2) as amended in 1970) grants the most comprehensive authority in that it designates the Deputy Minister as the Minister's alter ego with respect to the Minister's overall responsibilities. Two other statutes, the Financial Administration Act and the Public Service Employment Act, assign specific responsibilities for the financial and civilian personnel administration of the Department to the Deputy Minister.

The Chief of the Defence Staff, whose position was created in 1964 with the passage of Bill C-90, is the senior military advisor to the Minister of National Defence. The National Defence Act (Section 18(1)) charges him with "the control and administration of the Canadian Forces" and in this regard he is subject to direction by the Minister. It should be noted however that the National Defence Act (Section 18(2)) also states that "unless the Governor-in-Council otherwise directs, the Chief of the Defence Staff shall issue all orders and instructions to the Canadian Forces".

The Chief of the Defence Staff is also responsible for the effective conduct of military operations and the readiness of the Canadian Forces to meet the commitments assigned to the Department of National Defence by the Government. To the extent that these two responsibilities are carried out within the policy and financial restraints set by Parliament, the Chief of the Defence Staff is not subject to direction from the Minister or the Deputy Minister.

Other sections of the National Defence Act and certain regulations, such as parts of the Queen's Regulations and Orders, identify the Chief of the Defence Staff's specific powers and responsibilities. With regard to this latter category of powers and responsibilities, those which clearly - or by necessary implication - are given solely to the Chief of the Defence Staff and are within policy and financial restraints set by Parliament, are exercised by the Chief of the Defence Staff without direction from the Minister or the Deputy Minister.

Where national defence is concerned, the existence of the parliamentary system in Canada and the statutes of Parliament indicate the reality of civilian control over the Canadian Forces. Elaboration on the statutory authority and responsibilities of the Minister of National Defence, the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff demonstrate the degree to which the responsibilities of the three individuals holding these offices are complementary. Continuing and frequent consultation between the Minister and his two senior advisors, as well as consultation between the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff, on a large number of defence-related matters is necessary for discharging their responsibilities and maintaining the effective functioning of both the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

B. DEFENCE POLICY

The defence White Papers of 1964 and 1971 have set the official context for tasks assigned to the Canadian Forces throughout the period of integration and unification.

The 1964 White Paper stated that:

The objectives of Canadian defence policy, which cannot be dissociated from foreign policy, are to preserve the peace by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression; to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our participation in international organizations, and to provide for the protection and surveillance of our territory, our air-space and our coastal waters.²

The statement was actually an assertion of the traditional responsibility of military forces to provide for the security and protection of the state, together with a summary of a series of major commitments which Canada had made over the previous twenty-four years: collective security through charter membership in the United Nations in 1945; membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) collective defence alliance in 1949; and partnership with the United States for air defence of the North American continent in 1958 (NORAD).

Prior to World War II, Canada's armed forces had the primary function of maintaining themselves as a relatively small core that could serve as a foundation for training and deploying a much larger force in the event of war. The emphasis for the army in particular was on maintaining the Militia and preparing mobilization plans. After World War II, as Canada made the series of collective security and collective defence commitments, the primary function changed. Small operational units of the navy, army and air force were required to act on the treaty commitments and these

²White Paper on Defence, March 1964, p. 5.

units were given operational tasks in NATO and NORAD. They were also responsible for providing Canada's military contribution to the United Nations, if and when the need arose. Mobilization planning continued, but by 1959 there was "no serious attempt to maintain a mobilization base".³ Moreover, the Government had adopted a policy whereby only the brigade group serving in Europe was equipped at war establishment. The remainder of the army units received types and numbers of equipments required to maintain their training standards.

By 1964, when the White Paper was published, Canadian policy and the resultant tasking for the armed forces was heavily influenced by changes in strategic doctrine as it applied to NATO. The doctrine of "massive retaliation", whereby any Warsaw Pact invasion of a NATO member state would be met with nuclear weapons, was being replaced by the doctrine of "flexible response". The latter doctrine called for an alliance capability to respond to invasion with conventionally-armed forces, tactical nuclear weapons, or strategic nuclear weapons. At that time - and, to a considerable extent, still in 1979 - it was believed that while an armed conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO might begin on a conventional level, it would escalate rather rapidly to a nuclear exchange. This line of reasoning led to the conclusion that there was insufficient time for full scale mobilization along the World War I and II patterns. If deterrence failed, NATO would have to respond with the forces it had in Europe at the outbreak of hostilities, or forces that could be raised, equipped and transported to the theatre of battle within a few days. Thus the NATO concept of "forces in being" emerged gradually, but directly, from the change to the doctrine of flexible response. "Forces in being" fitted rather neatly with previous Canadian policy decisions concerning the requirement for small operational units, the variations in types and levels of equipment, and the lack of a mobilization base.

Another major influence on tasking was the recognition that, because of Canada's geographic position and various features of nuclear strategic weapons, the strategic threat to Canada was largely indirect. That is, any external threat to Canada was actually a threat to North America as a whole - in the event that, if deterrence failed, there was a nuclear exchange between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) - or to one or more of the European NATO members. The defence of Canada would therefore consist mainly of contributing to NORAD and NATO collective defence arrangements, both of which were organized on the principle of deterring war rather than fighting one. The size of the forces was to remain modest - versatility and flexibility would allow them to meet the various tasks that the Government assigned.⁴ The command structure in NATO and NORAD along with Canada's modest contribution ensured that, if deterrence failed, Canadian sea, land and air units would be fighting under the command of non-Canadians. In a larger sense of preventing war by maintaining peace and security in the world, Canada would also contribute forces for United Nations service in the form of operational units or specialist support

³Ibid., p. 9.

⁴Ibid., pp. 12, 14, 19, 22, 23.

units for peacekeeping operations and personnel for military observation missions. What remained for the defence of Canada within Canada were the tasks of territorial (land, coastal waters, air-space) surveillance and control, aid to the civil power for internal security and protection, search and rescue, and assistance to civil authorities at times of natural disaster or other emergencies.

The 1964 White Paper set the objective of Canadian defence policy in the following apparent order of priority:

- a. maintaining peace and security through the United Nations;
- b. contributing to NATO collective defence;
- c. contributing to the defence of North America; and
- d. providing for certain aspects of security and protection within Canada.⁵

The White Paper then suggested guidelines for a reorganization of Canada's armed forces in order to meet these objectives more efficiently and effectively. As noted in Section II of this report, the reorganization led first to integration, then unification.

In Defence in the 70s, the 1971 White Paper on defence, the general objectives of Canadian defence policy remained the same as those of 1964, but the order of priority appeared to be reversed. They were listed as follows:

- a. the surveillance of our own territory and coastlines, that is the protection of our sovereignty;
- b. the defence of North America in cooperation with United States forces;
- c. the fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon; and
- d. the performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume.⁶

Although the basic objectives were identical, the order of priority among them and, to some extent the tasks associated with the objectives, were influenced by a number of changes in national concerns and international trends.

⁵Ibid., p. 6.

⁶Defence in the 70s, p. 16.

With regard to changes in national interests, such events as increased oil and gas exploration in the North, the voyages of the oil tanker Manhattan and improvements in fishing techniques had caused increased concern for the protection of resources and the environment. In order to have greater control over these activities, the Government established a pollution control zone in Arctic waters, extended the limits of the territorial sea, and extended the limits of fishing (and pollution control) zones of the East and West coasts. The resource-related activities were regarded as possible challenges - of a mainly non-military nature - to Canadian sovereignty, independence and security. As these challenges, if carried out, would have to be met entirely by Canada through the enforcement of Canadian laws and as the Department of National Defence had the overall responsibility for providing adequate territorial surveillance and control, Canada's military forces were to give first priority to providing defence resources for air and sea surveillance and control.

A second source for a change in the priority according to national interests was the series of civil disorders that had occurred in the years immediately before the White Paper was published. The Canadian Forces had been called out for the Montreal police strike, the Kingston Penitentiary riots and the FLQ crisis. Based on that set of experiences, greater attention was given to the fact that such types of emergencies might arise again. The Government had decided, therefore, that the military - particularly the land forces - should devote resources to its internal security responsibilities.

Finally, there were certain national aims which the Government wanted the Canadian Forces to serve on a lower priority basis. Because of their composition, skills and capabilities, the Canadian Forces could contribute to national unity, national identity and national development in the civil sector - all of which would also promote closer relations between the military and the civilian sectors of Canadian society.

In summary, the White Paper placed such Department of National Defence roles as territorial (land, sea and air) surveillance and control, aid to the civil power and a broader range of assistance to civil authorities on a higher priority than before. In addition to the change in priority, certain (new) tasks, such as "sovereignty flights", fisheries patrols, and bridge and air strip construction in the North were assigned to elements of the Canadian Forces.

On the international level, the White Paper noted a trend toward "a loosening of the bipolar [US-USSR] international system" and a disappointing record in the "prospects for effective international peacekeeping".⁷ While the essential nature of the strategic threat to Canada remained the same, certain qualitative changes had occurred since 1964. These changes included: an increase in the stability of nuclear deterrence; a decline in the relative importance of intercontinental

⁷Ibid., p. 1.

bombers as strategic delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons; an apparent continuation of progress in détente between the US and the USSR, as evidenced in the inauguration of potentially important series of arms control negotiations; and growing economic prosperity and political cohesion in Western Europe. In the Government's estimation this meant that while the defence of Canada from external strategic threats would consist of continued participation in collective defence arrangements, the precise nature of our contribution would change. Indeed some of the changes in contribution, and therefore some tasks for the Canadian Forces, had occurred before the 1971 White Paper was published. With respect to the defence of North America, Canadian air and maritime forces would continue in their role of helping to protect the US strategic deterrent but, since the bomber threat had declined, Canada would "update its contribution to active bomber defences...only to the extent...required for the general control of Canadian air-space".⁸ There was also an intent to reduce the priority attached to the anti-submarine warfare role of the maritime forces in favour of "other maritime roles"⁹ - presumably those connected with the national interests described earlier in this section.

With respect to NATO, Canadian sea, land and air forces would continue in their roles of helping to deter war in the NATO area, but the growing capability of the European members to provide the forces to defend their national homelands allowed the Government to alter both the deployment and roles of the Canadian Forces which were designated for NATO. As a result of decisions taken in 1969, the combined strength of Canadian Forces stationed in Europe was reduced from 10,000 to 5,000. Canada's land forces in Europe were to be given a new reserve role and new tasks in tactical reconnaissance, while the air squadrons were to shift, by 1972, from reconnaissance and nuclear strike roles to a conventional attack role. Their new task was to be tactical ground support for NATO, as opposed to support for solely Canadian land forces. The maritime forces would continue in their role of contributing ships to the multinational Standing Naval Force Atlantic.

Although the numbers of Canadian Forces personnel in Europe were to be reduced, there would be no reduction in the forces which were stationed in Canada but earmarked for emergency deployment to northwest Europe. These included: an air-transportable battalion group committed to the multinational Allied Command Europe Mobile Force Land (AMF(L)) if it deployed to Denmark or Norway; a Canadian air/sea transportable combat group (CAST combat group) - of which our AMF(L) battalion group was a part - also committed for emergency deployment to the NATO northern flank area; and two air squadrons, with photo reconnaissance and ground support roles, committed to the same region. Canada's Reserve Force - particularly the Militia - was given a new role. They were to be included in Canada's "forces in being" along with the Regular Force commitments to NATO.

⁸Ibid., p. 30.

⁹Ibid., p. 28.

The lowest priority was apparently assigned to Canada's peacekeeping activities that were connected with our collective security efforts through the United Nations. Although disappointed with the record of effectiveness of peacekeeping, the Government still intended to task a battalion group as stand-by for such activities.

The 1971 White Paper, in reordering the priorities among the basic objectives of defence policy, placed new emphasis on a range of tasks for the Canadian Forces within Canada while making some significant cuts or changes in the range of tasks to be performed abroad. Multiple tasking and versatility - as opposed to specialization - were to be the hallmarks for the more efficient performance of this changed array of tasks. These principles allowed for, or responded to, the decline in the priority accorded to national defence in relation to other government activities. Once again Canada was in a period of prolonged peace with the consequent historic difficulty in justifying large defence expenditures. That difficulty was compounded by other considerations. The requirement for Canada to defend itself against an external threat was a remote possibility. Apart from the horror engendered at the thought of a nuclear war, the nature of the strategic threat to Canada was rather amorphous. There was a widespread belief that détente was not only possible, but real and progressing. Thus, the decline in authorized military personnel, in the real value of the defence budget and in equipment procurement which had started in the early to mid-1960s continued. (See Part C - Defence Budget).

There has been no new White Paper since 1971, but certain Department of National Defence activities such as the long range equipment plans that were begun in the mid-1970s and the exact equipment to be procured, suggest that there has been another reordering of priorities. Although it by no means carries the authority of a White Paper, further evidence of this alteration is contained in a Department of National Defence publication which states that Canada's "defence policy is based on a trinity of measures which:

- a. contribute to collective defence in North America, Western Europe and NATO maritime areas;
- b. support broad international initiatives - particularly within the United Nations - to promote peaceful change; and
- c. provide for the protection of Canadian national interests".¹⁰


This apparent change in the priorities, different from both the 1964 and 1971 priorities, among defence policy goals has not been accompanied by any change in tasking of the Canadian Forces.

¹⁰Department of National Defence, Defence 1978, p. 7.

In spite of the various changes in emphasis concerning priorities and tasks over the past fifteen years, several constants can be identified: the nature of the external strategic threat to Canada has remained, in essence, the same; the basic objectives of Canada's defence policy have not changed; the size of the Canadian Forces was foreseen to remain relatively modest in peace and war; in the event of armed conflict, under the aegis of NATO or NORAD, Canadian Forces would fight as components of larger, multinational units and under the command of non-Canadians; and the requirement to provide forces for United Nations peacekeeping activities has not changed.


C. DEFENCE BUDGET

The position of defence in the order of Canada's national priorities since 1965 can be measured by examining the share of total federal budget devoted to the defence program. Figure 1 shows an almost steady decline from the point, in 1965, when the defence program accounted for approximately 20 percent of the total federal budget, to 1976-77 when the share was 8.6 percent. Although figures for 1977-78 and 1978-79 cannot be calculated accurately as yet, it appears that the share has remained more or less constant over the past three years. It should be noted that the Department of National Defence budget is the third largest of all government departments, exceeded only by the budgets of the Departments of Finance and National Health and Welfare.



This decline may seem incongruous, in view of the size of defence expenditures over the same period. In 1962-63, the Department of National Defence expenditures were nearly \$1.6 billion.¹¹ As Figure 2 shows, expenditures hovered between \$1.5 billion and \$2 billion until 1972-73, when a steady increase began. By 1978-79, defence expenditures were approximately \$4.1 billion.

FIGURE 2
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURES IN BUDGET YEAR DOLLARS




Although defence expenditures were increasing, government expenditures in other areas were growing so much more rapidly that defence was actually taking a decreasing proportion of the total federal budget. This situation follows earlier Canadian trends during periods of prolonged peace. Further pressure on lowering the priority to be accorded to defence in the late 1960s and 1970s was exerted by a government perception that the cold war was ending and the era of détente would develop to replace it.

¹¹The sources for all figures in the text and graphs in this report are, unless otherwise noted, the Public Accounts and the Canada Yearbook.

If the declining national priority accorded to defence is set aside, in order to focus on the fiscal ability of the Department of National Defence to carry out its mandated activities and tasks, another series of observations should be made. Figure 2 indicates defence expenditure increases over the period of integration and unification. When the effects of inflation over that same period of time are taken into account, Figure 3 shows an overall decline in the purchasing power of the funds made available to it by the Government.

FIGURE 3

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURES IN CONSTANT (FY 79/80) DOLLARS



The expenditures of \$1.6 billion in 1962-63, for example, had a purchasing power of some 16 percent more than the approximately \$4.1 billion in 1978-79.


This decline in purchasing power has had severe effects on Department of National Defence activities and plans. As a result, major components of the budget - personnel, operations, maintenance and capital - have been reduced repeatedly.

It should be noted, before proceeding with a discussion of these reductions, that there were several causes for this decline which are not related to changes in defence policy. The nature of most Department of National Defence activities requires both long range planning and a stable financing base. The planning is translated, for financing purposes, into approved personnel levels and authorized budget ceilings - both of which are expressed in a funding formula to be used over a period of several years.

The Department of National Defence, with the approval of the Treasury Board, has tried four different funding formulas since 1964. One of the major causes for the decline in defence expenditures in real terms has been that the first three formulas, in spite of the Department's best intentions and efforts, did not take sufficient account of inflation and price increases over the 1964-1977 period. Another cause for the decline was the Government's fiscal restraint program which resulted in various cuts to the budget ceiling over the three fiscal years from 1977 to 1980 when the fourth formula was in effect. In the same three year period, the Department was ordered to absorb the additional costs of some increases in activities, such as the fighter aircraft (CF101 and CF104) and destroyer life extension programs, within the reduced budget ceilings.


Since 1964, one high priority Department of National Defence goal has been to reach and maintain a level of capital expenditures that constituted 25 percent of total defence expenditures. A large proportion of capital expenditure is devoted to equipment procurement and the 25 percent ratio of capital expenditure to total defence expenditure is used, in most western industrialized states, to indicate the minimum level of equipment replacement required to maintain defence activities at the same quality of performance over time. As Figure 4 indicates, this goal was not achieved at any point in the 1964-1976 period.

FIGURE 4
CAPITAL AND EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE DEFENCE BUDGET



The proportion of defence expenditures devoted to capital declined from 18 percent in 1964-65 to a low-point of 8.2 percent in 1972-73. The proportion devoted specifically to equipment procurement declined from 14.8 percent to 5.9 percent during the same period. Since 1972-73, there has been a gradual increase. By 1978-79, capital expenditures accounted for approximately 15.6 percent of total expenditures, while the equipment procurement ratio had increased to approximately 12.3 percent.

The decline in defence expenditures also had a severe effect on the approved military personnel levels of the Canadian Forces, as shown in Figure 5.



There was a steady, rather sharp decline from 1963-64, when the authorized military personnel level stood at 120,781, to 1975-76 when it was 78,033. Over eleven years, total Canadian Forces military personnel had decreased by 34 percent. Much of that decline was instituted by the Department of National Defence in an effort to increase capital expenditure toward the 25 percent goal in a situation where the total expenditure itself remained constant or declined, and any increase in the proportion of the budget devoted to capital could only be realized by decreasing the proportions allocated to personnel, operations and/or maintenance. Since 1975-76, there has been a marginal increase in the number of military personnel, due to the implementation of the Government's decision to increase the authorized military personnel ceiling by some 4,700 over a period of several years.

Two decisions, made by the Government in the late 1970s, will continue to have a major effect on the Department of National Defence's fiscal ability to carry out its mandated activities and tasks. The current funding formula, in use since 1976-77, provides for an annual increase of 12 percent in real growth for capital expenditures until these expenditures reach a level of 20 percent of the total budget. This provision was made in recognition of severe under-funding in the past and the consequent urgent requirement to procure such major items of new equipment as tanks, fighter aircraft and ships. The length of the acquisition processes and therefore the long range planning involved, dictated the need for a stable, predictable forecast of future budget ceilings. Based on the funding formula, the Department of National Defence has planned its equipment procurement program as shown in Figure 6. It should be noted that this program extends at least to 1993.


A decrease in capital expenditures could occur in any one or more of the following situations: a government decision to decrease, in real terms, total defence expenditures; an increase in inflation unforeseen by the current funding formula which would cause a decrease in the purchasing power of total defence expenditures; an unforeseen requirement for increasing some other major component of the defence budget - that is, personnel, maintenance or operations - which would cause a downward adjustment in the proportion allocated to capital expenditures.

The latter possibility has already occurred. In 1979-80, (and extending at least until 1982-83) the extra unforeseen costs of, for example, the aircraft and destroyer life extension programs had to be absorbed within the formula-based total defence budget ceiling. Those programs were in the maintenance portion of the budget. As a result of increases in the maintenance portion, the real growth in capital expenditures had to be cut to a level less than 12 percent for 1979-80.

The second decision concerns the Government's commitment to NATO in 1978: Canada, like all other NATO members, would increase defence expenditures in real terms by 3 percent per year over a five year period. In 1978, Canadian defence expenditures, as defined by NATO, were experiencing a real growth rate of approximately 3 percent. Projections, based on current and planned expenditures, show that the goal has not been met for 1979-80.

Defence activities over the past fifteen years have been subject to an adverse budgetary context. The impact on those aspects of operational effectiveness that are related to having sufficient personnel and appropriate equipment to carry out the tasks assigned to the Canadian Forces by the Government has been illustrated. Although the budget situation for the present has shown some marginal improvement, there is real vulnerability to further decline over the near term.

FIGURE 6
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE CAPITAL ACQUISITION 15 YEAR PROGRAM



Legend:

- AVGP — Armoured Vehicle, General-Purpose
- TARP — Terminal Aids Replacement Program
- SAMSON — Strategic, Automatic Message-Switching Operational Network
- ASSMS — Anti-Surface Ship Missile System
- AIP — Improvement of Artillery Weapons
- ADLIPS — Automatic Data-Link Plotting System
- ROCC — Regional Operational Control Centres
- LRPA — Long Range Patrol Aircraft

Source: Department of National Defence,
Defence 1978, page 119.

SECTION IV

EVOLUTION OF UNIFICATION

INTRODUCTION

This section is a brief description of defence activity from 1963 to 1979 and indicates the relationships among the three primary influences - defence policy, integration/unification, and budget. It is intended as a frame of reference for subsequent sections.

A. PRE-INTEGRATION

The Liberal Government assumed office in 1963 at a time when defence matters had been prominent in politics. Defence policy and impending equipment funding difficulties were the most dominant features of departmental concerns.

The budget of the Department of National Defence represented a major portion of government expenditures. In 1961 defence purchasing represented 25 percent of total federal expenditures. Its wage bill was more than all other federal government departments together. The Department managed 6 million acres of land in Canada and occupied over 140 million square feet of floor space - about 80 percent of all space owned and leased by government.¹

Government policy committed the armed forces to collective defence under direction of external agencies such as NATO, NORAD and the United Nations. The forces met a number of separate obligations under these agencies such as a mechanized brigade group as part of NATO land forces in Europe, an air group under NATO European air direction, a standing contribution to NATO Atlantic naval arrangements, and operation of a NORAD region. The forces had also contributed to a wide variety of United Nations operations, support and truce supervision missions.

The principal function of the Department of National Defence headquarters was to direct and regulate the manning, training, arming, supply and accommodation of the armed forces, and to provide them with health and welfare services in order to produce troops to meet external commitments. Each of the three services supported specific contributions under Canada's collective agreements, were independently organized to meet these tasks, and were coordinated in detail in such aspects as planning, doctrine, organization, and equipment.

The Royal Canadian Navy deployed a fleet of vessels, maintained a headquarters, schools, a base and dockyard on each coast, its own communication system, reserve units and an array of supply depots. The

¹Royal Commission on Government Organization, Volume 4, Report 20, pp. 63-64.

Canadian army maintained a regional array of four major headquarters and 11 area headquarters that directed its administration, training and school activities across Canada. The Royal Canadian Air Force directed five functional headquarters, each of which controlled its own array of facilities in the functions of air defence, transport, training, materiel and maritime aviation.

Each service maintained a national headquarters in Ottawa (see Annex D). Coordination of military activities was achieved by a Chiefs of Staff Committee involving the three service heads, a Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chairman of the Defence Research Board. Ministerial control was exercised through a Defence Council, and coordination by about two hundred inter-service committees.

In the period leading up to integration a number of events deserve attention. There was a crisis looming in re-equipping the forces. Costs were escalating dramatically; significant re-equipping of the navy and the army was of immediate concern; the Canadian record in design and procurement had been less than impeccable, for example, the new fighter aircraft (the Arrow) and the armoured personnel carrier (the Bobcat) were scrapped after costly development. Worse, personnel and administrative costs were dramatically reducing the budget allotment devoted to equipment. Personnel costs had risen from 23.6 percent of the defence dollar in 1951 to 38.2 percent in 1962. It was confidently predicted that without significant budget increases there would be no money for capital equipment acquisition by 1969.

B. THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION (THE GLASSCO COMMISSION)

In 1961 the Glassco Commission was appointed to examine the whole of the government service, to eliminate duplication and uneconomic operations, and to recommend improvements in decentralization and more efficient management practices. In 1963 this Commission recommended significant changes to government practices. For the Department of National Defence, it recommended:

- a. appointment of a single "Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff" to direct the forces and to control common elements. The Commission forecast the necessity of much greater integration of support functions, and the Chief of the Defence Staff concept was essential to that process.
- b. the Deputy Minister be given greater responsibility for reviewing organization and administration. Assessment by the Deputy Minister of such matters as budget, expenditures, audits and personnel establishments, and his control of real property would provide the necessary elements of independent review to ensure civilian control.
- c. a comprehensive review of civilian and military manpower needs, providing better career opportunities and use of civilians for better management and economy.

The Department of National Defence had anticipated some of the recommendations of the Glassco Commission on personnel policy and in 1961 formed a Minister's Manpower Study Group. The group reported a number of times in 1962, but its work was overtaken by the federal general elections of 1962 and 1963, by the Glassco Commission Report of 1963, and by other Public Service studies. The group advised that to achieve significant economies in any function, such as transportation or supply, complete integration of the three service systems would be necessary.

C. INTEGRATION - 1964-1967

In 1963 the Government discerned an urgent need for a defence policy review. The re-equipment programs were linked to our alliance commitments. National and political opinion was divided on nuclear armament policy. The funding forecasts clearly indicated increasing difficulty in meeting the capital program requirements.

Integration of functions in the armed forces to promote a joint forces view and to economize had been discussed previously. The formation of the National Defence College in 1948, the tri-service policy in the Canadian Services Colleges, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee concept all supported development of a joint integrated outlook. Prior to 1960, for economy and to promote common policies, the legal branch and the medical and chaplain support services were integrated. The dental, pay and food procurement functions were assigned to the army to provide support for the three armed services. Up to 1964, attempts by the three services at integration of common functions had been slow and laborious.

It became apparent that the Department of National Defence would have to reduce internal costs drastically. As the Glassco Commission and in-house studies had shown, achievement of these internal savings would require integration, because the tri-service committees would not likely move far enough nor fast enough to yield significant savings. Major integration would be necessary, and this would only be possible under a single Chief of the Defence Staff with the power to direct. The Minister commissioned internal studies to consider both a new national headquarters structure and integration. Also in 1963, the Parliamentary Special Committee on Defence was established which discussed integration of the services as well as policy.

In the event, a new White Paper on Defence was issued in 1964, setting the policy which maintained our alliance commitments and provided guidelines that would correct the funding imbalance, the rigidities inherent in the tri-service structure, and the weaknesses in coordination in the national headquarters.

The reorganization in the White Paper turned out historically to be carried out in the following sequence:

Stage I: Establish a single chain of command reporting to the Minister to replace the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Stage II: Integrate all administrative services, supply, communications, personnel, accounting and operations functions.

Stage III: Unify the three existing services into a single force.

In May 1964, Bill C-90 was passed, implementing Stage I. The structure of the new headquarters is shown in the organizational chart at Annex E.

The Minister had made his selections for appointments in this new structure before the Bill was passed, and on approval of the Bill, these officers started work immediately to meet his intent in implementing the first and second stages.

Information services were integrated, committees were established, a planning group was formed to work out the details of the headquarters structure, an integrated defence program system was developed, a system concept for greater budget delegation was tested, recruiting was integrated and study began on a common supply system.

In 1965 the transformation continued. Intelligence activities of the three services were integrated, a blueprint was tabled for the officer career structure in an integrated force and the national headquarters integration neared completion.

In the planning, Canadian Forces Headquarters was intended to be the focus for policy formulation and direction, coordination and common functions. Tasks would be assigned to subordinate commands which would direct operations and develop the necessary team or collective skills to do so. In the search for areas of commonality among the services, integration brought about a functional re-organization of the Canadian Forces Headquarters. This approach permitted across-the-board, concurrent identification of what was common, what could be common, and how to act on this commonality.

The new command structure retained the familiar air components and approach of maritime air, air defence, and air transport. The air force concept for individual training, materiel and logistics was adopted in the formation of two Canadian Forces commands - Training Command and Materiel Command.

A major instrument for reacting to the new commitments forecast in the White Paper was to be Mobile Command. This Command, inaugurated in October 1965, was to stress lighter forces and air portability. An associated tactical air group was formed to include reconnaissance, utility and transport helicopters, ground attack fighters and light transport aircraft. Air Transport Command and Maritime Command were to emphasize increased capability for troop transport.

Maritime Command would continue its two-coast operation with an associated maritime air group. This group included patrol aircraft and the ship-borne helicopters.

The foundation for administration and local support was to be the base concept. A common base organization, on the Royal Canadian Air Force model, was selected for domestic, personnel, logistic and administrative services. These bases were assigned to the various parent commands according to the primary training and operational functions being performed. The base commander was expected to direct the major functions and to provide local support to on-site "lodger" units belonging to other commands.

Regional responsibilities, including aid to the civil power and assistance to the civil authorities, were allocated to the major functional commands - the Atlantic Provinces to Maritime Command, Quebec to Mobile Command, Ontario to Air Transport Command, the Prairie Provinces to Training Command, and British Columbia to Maritime Pacific Region, a subordinate of Maritime Command.

The strategic, national and air defence communications were integrated into the Canadian Forces Communication System, re-designated as a command in 1970.

In 1966 authority was transferred to the new field command structure and the base concept was initiated. Common personnel procedures were implemented such as terms of service, officers' annual performance reports and the development of a standard rank and trade structure.

D. UNIFICATION 1967-1971

In May 1967, Bill C-243 was passed introducing the final stage of reorganization, both in Canadian Forces Headquarters and in the commands. The Canadian Forces grappled with the complexities of almost total change coupled with the need for continuity as new functional structures were emerging. Adjustments took place in the Canadian Forces Headquarters and throughout the forces. To cope with continuity and coordination, individual trades training and the schools for combat arms were assigned to Mobile Command and the sea trades training to Maritime Command. Materiel Command was absorbed into the Technical Services Branch at Canadian Forces Headquarters.

This process was accelerated throughout by the pressure of economies. The funding basis for the Department of National Defence had been established for 1965-1970 at \$1.55 billion plus 2 percent per year for inflation. In 1963 inflation was already 3.5 percent and it rose further and regularly throughout the 1960s. To achieve the budget goal of 25 percent to be spent on capital equipment, personnel reductions had to be imposed simultaneously with reorganization. For example, Canadian Forces Headquarters was to be 30 percent smaller than the previous national headquarters and the Mobile Command plan for a personnel establishment of about 34,000 was quickly reduced to less than 24,000.

By 1970, although over 22,000 military personnel positions had been eliminated since 1963-64 and the 1969-70 authorized strength was down to 98,000 personnel, the capital budget had shrunk to 13.9 percent from the 16.3 percent in 1965-66.

During this period, internal changes continued. Distribution of a new uniform commenced in 1969. A Northern Region Headquarters was established in 1970. New personnel policies to replace the policies of the former three services were developed.

In April 1969 the Prime Minister announced new defence priorities in this order: surveillance of Canadian territory, defence of North America, NATO support and United Nations peacekeeping. The Canadian Forces in Europe would be reduced; they would be reorganized in a manner that reflected the organization of Canadian Forces based in Canada. A policy review would be conducted, and in the meantime, the defence budget was frozen for three years at \$1.8 billion. In 1971 these and other changes were made official in the new White Paper on Defence (for details see Section III, Part B).

E. CHANGES - 1972-1979

The new funding directions and an 8 percent inflation rate reduced capital spending even further (down to 8.2 percent of the defence budget in 1972-73). Personnel levels had been reduced in fiscal year 1972-73 to 38,254 civilian and 81,769 military, from the 1969-70 level of 40,112 civilian and 98,000 military.

There were still problems in Department of National Defence management. The ship replacement program had been very slow and involved frequent cost increases. There was concern over the planning process, accountability and control in capital acquisition programs and the apparent duplication of interests and involvement on the part of the Deputy Minister's office, Canadian Forces Headquarters and the Defence Research Board. A Management Review Group, appointed in 1971, was directed to address ship procurement specifically, and more generally the civilian, military and defence research relationships, command and control, logistics and acquisition policies, cost and performance objectives, and relationships with other government departments. The Management Review Group reported in 1972. As a result, a new National Defence Headquarters organization was implemented, integrating the staffs of the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff. This reorganization and an accompanying program management system were instituted in 1972.

By 1973 further drastic activity and maintenance reductions were made and personnel numbers were decreased once again. In 1975-76 a further 5,700 positions were deleted, reducing the military strength to 78,000. Some radar stations were closed, the Falcon transport aircraft fleet was restricted, and staff consolidations and reductions were pursued more resolutely.

In 1975, to provide a more effective air force and to facilitate further economies, Air Command was formed. This Command directed the two former air commands - Transport and Air Defence, as well as the three air groups (10 Tactical Air Group, Maritime Air Group and 1 Canadian Air Group), and associated bases.

Training Command was downgraded in status to a "System" and assumed the regional responsibilities of the former Air Transport Command. For the Canadian Forces Training System, it meant reduction of the Commander's rank to Brigadier-General, and made him responsible to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) instead of the Chief of the Defence Staff.

In 1974-75 the major equipments in service were at or near the end of effective service and life extensions had become costly. Aircraft, both for air defence and for NATO, urgently required replacement. The destroyer fleet, other than the four new DDH 280s, had limited life and were obsolete. The tank was to be phased out in 1976, and with it the mechanized fighting capability in the land forces. Worse, many more programs had to be considered very soon, including the vehicle fleet, plant, communications, ammunition, and small arms. Unless early action was taken, Canada's contribution to the major collective agreements would soon be reduced to token status.

In 1975 a new five year funding formula, indexed to inflation, was introduced for the 1976-1981 period, providing funding increases for personnel, operations and maintenance as well as a 12 percent per annum real growth for the capital budget.

This new funding formula for 1976-77 reversed the decline in plant and many services, and permitted commitment to important equipment purchases, such as contracts to purchase tanks for the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, maritime patrol aircraft, and multi-purpose light armoured vehicles. Artillery, communications, aircraft and other equipments were updated. Commitment was made to future purchases of fighter aircraft for NORAD and NATO roles and of patrol frigates. (See Figure 6, Section III, Part C - Defence Budget).

Also, there was recognition that the personnel reductions had been less than prudent, and 4,707 additional military positions were approved to be phased in over a period of years. This increase was to redress the personnel restrictions throughout the Canadian Forces. To date this increase has been limited to fewer than 1,000.

The formation of Air Command also marked a degree of relaxation of some of the absolutes of unification. The words "navy", "army" and "air force" became accepted terminology, replacing "element" or "environment". Greater latitude was permitted in unit, branch and environmental identification.

F. THE FORCES TODAY

The Department of National Defence operates with a unified single national headquarters organized on functional lines with some functional subordinate organizations, three major environmental commands and an array of bases.

The following paragraphs outline very generally the organization and functioning of the Department of National Defence, the National Defence Headquarters and the command systems.

i) The Department of National Defence and National Defence Headquarters Systems

As shown in Annex G, National Defence Headquarters is a single functionally organized headquarters. It is directed jointly by the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff, assisted by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, four Assistant Deputy Ministers and other specialists. (Responsibilities in law of the Minister, the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff are detailed in Section III, Part A).

The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible to the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff. He acts as the chief of staff of the National Defence Headquarters, in coordinating both the activities of the headquarters groups and the assignment of resources.

Departmental activity is directed by five group principals whose primary functional responsibilities are summarized below.

- a. Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy): recommends defence objectives and policy options and directs development planning. In the absence of the Deputy Minister, he is Acting Deputy Minister.
- b. Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff: is responsible for effective and efficient performance of the operations of the forces. He is the source of operational information for planning and programming.
- c. Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel): develops and implements military and civilian personnel policies, career management, recruiting, individual training, educational programs and personnel support services.
- d. Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel): directs engineering and maintenance, logistics (supply, transportation, procurement, ammunition), construction and properties, research and development. He commands, through his military associate, the Canadian Forces depots and test establishments.
- e. Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance): directs audit, financial services and management services.

Policy direction and coordination among the senior members of the Department and the group principals is achieved through a committee structure. The Defence Council, the senior of these committees, meets weekly and is the forum for the exchange of views and information between the Minister and his senior departmental officials. The Defence Council is chaired by the Minister with the Deputy Minister, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and the Parliamentary Secretary as members.

The Defence Management Committee is the major departmental coordinating committee. It considers all significant matters of policy, plans, programs and administration that require the approval of the Minister, the Deputy Minister or the Chief of the Defence Staff. It meets weekly and is chaired by the Deputy Minister and co-chaired by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Membership includes the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), the Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) and the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff.

Coordination of resource management is achieved through the Defence Services Program. In controlling the Defence Services Program, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is assisted by the Program Control Board which matches resources with requirements. Members include the group principals, the Chief of Evaluation and the Chief of Program. Capital requirements are reviewed for the Program Control Board by its sub-committee, chaired by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff.

A more informal forum is the Chief of the Defence Staff operations briefing which occurs daily. Events of the past 24 hours are reviewed and matters of general interest or concern likely to occur in the succeeding 24 hours are considered and direction obtained where required. It is attended by the Deputy Minister, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, all Assistant Deputy Ministers, the Director General Information, and the Chief of Program.

The Armed Forces Council, chaired by the Chief of the Defence Staff, provides a forum for review of matters of general policy and general discussion of matters of concern. The Armed Forces Council members include the Commanders of Maritime Command, Mobile Command and Air Command, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. The Chief of the Defence Staff calls these meetings.

Outside of National Defence Headquarters the Canadian Forces are grouped into the following major organizational elements under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff:

- a. Functional organizations: Maritime Command, Mobile Command, Air Command, Communication Command, Canadian Forces Europe and the Canadian Forces Training System.

b. Regional organizations: Six regional commanders for liaison and assistance to the civil sector:

- Atlantic Region (The Atlantic Provinces) - Headquarters Maritime Command;
- Eastern Region (Quebec) - Headquarters Mobile Command;
- Central Region (Ontario) - Headquarters Canadian Forces Training System;
- Prairie Region (Prairie Provinces) - Headquarters Air Command;
- Pacific Region (British Columbia) - Headquarters Maritime Forces Pacific; and
- Northern Region (Yukon and Northwest Territories) - Headquarters Northern Region.

ii) Commands

Maritime Command

Maritime Command is responsible for the provision of operationally-ready maritime forces to meet Canada's defence commitments. The Commander commands all surface and sub-surface forces and has operational control over maritime aircraft. His headquarters is in Halifax, with a subordinate headquarters, Maritime Forces Pacific, in Esquimalt, British Columbia. He is responsible for Canadian naval operations throughout the world, exercises operational control of Canadian and United States maritime forces operating in Canadian waters in defence of North America, and commands the Canadian Atlantic sub-area of the NATO Allied Command, Atlantic. In his capacity as Commander of Atlantic Region, he is also the authority who keeps contact with the governments of each of the Atlantic Provinces in matters relating to aid to the civil power, assistance to the civil authorities, and other delegated regional matters including coordination of air/sea rescue on both coasts.

The Command controls 23 major vessels, 3 submarines, the Naval Reserve and schools for the trades training of the sea trades and for officer development. Aircraft support, both patrol aircraft and helicopters, is provided by Maritime Air Group under the operational control of Maritime Command.

Mobile Command

Mobile Command is tasked to maintain combat-ready land and tactical air forces for Canadian defence commitments including protection of Canadian territory, support of NATO commitments, and for support of peacekeeping or peace-restoring operations. The headquarters in St. Hubert, Quebec directs two all-arms combat groups, a Special Service Force, a Combat Training Centre and the Militia. It is also the Regional Headquarters for support to, and in the province of Quebec.

The combat groups are approximately 3,000 to 4,000 strong, and provide about 700 reinforcements to Europe each year, a battalion to Cyprus twice a year, a battalion on call to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land), a Combat Group dedicated to the NATO northern flank, crisis reinforcement of NATO in Central Europe and forces for defence of Canada.

Air support to Mobile Command is provided by 10 Tactical Air Group, under operational control of Mobile Command. The Group includes tactical helicopters and fixed-wing close support fighters.

Air Command

Air Command Headquarters in Winnipeg is responsible for providing operationally-ready air forces to meet the Canadian Forces commitments. These are provided by its subordinate and functional air groups:

- a. Maritime Air Group for patrol and helicopter support to Maritime Command;
- b. 10 Tactical Air Group for close support fighters and helicopter support to Mobile Command;
- c. Air Defence Group for direction of the Canadian contribution to NORAD; and
- d. Air Transport Group for all types of air lift and search and rescue.

Other responsibilities of Air Command include Prairie Region, the Air Reserve and flying training in three flying schools.

Communication Command

Communication Command operates strategic communications for the Canadian Forces and for governments in emergencies, and provides the static Canadian Forces communication system.

The headquarters in Ottawa directs five regional groups, and the squadrons and detachments which provide base communications. It directs the Communication Reserve.

Canadian Forces Europe

This comprises a headquarters, the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group responsible to NATO Central Army Group, and 1 Canadian Air Group responsible to the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force.

Northern Region

This region has a small headquarters in Yellowknife, North West Territories. It maintains military contact with the territorial governments, and acts as a coordinator of departmental activity in the North. It also assists a variety of other government departments in their activities in the North.

Canadian Forces Training System

The System headquarters in Trenton, Ontario directs schools for Canadian Forces new entry and individual training with the exceptions of the combat arms trades, the sea trades, flying training, and on-job trades training. It is also the Regional Headquarters for Ontario.

SECTION V

SUMMARY OF VIEWS EXPRESSED TO THE TASK FORCE

INTRODUCTION

Section I describes the approach of the Task Force to its mandate and its sources of information. This section deals with the opinions expressed in briefs and testimony and presents them under appropriate category headings. The descending order of the sub-headings in this section indicates the emphasis placed on these issues by the witnesses. There is no attempt in this section to pass judgement on the validity of the views expressed; rather, the intent is to portray the spectrum of opinions which have been presented.

Some opinions included comments which bore no relationship to unification but covered areas of perceived ills or complaints by witnesses. Some opinions included comments which had not taken the evolution of unification into account and therefore may have been directed at perceived deficiencies which have already been corrected. Some witnesses currently serving in the Canadian Forces commented that the Task Force hearings were the first opportunity they had had to express their true feelings about the Canadian Forces in general and the results of unification in particular.

Many witnesses observed that although many other countries had studied Canada's unified force structure, not one had followed Canada's example. Witnesses submitted this fact as grounds for a careful review of the Canadian system to determine whether or not Canada should continue with its present form of military organization.

Although the Reserve Force and cadets will be discussed under a separate heading, this does not indicate that the volume of opinions in this area relegates them to a low priority. It is merely a technique to present under a single heading opinions on a variety of subjects concerning this area of support to the Regular Force.

Opinion summaries are presented under the following headings:

- Command and Control
- Identity
- Support Services
- Training
- Personnel System
- Recruiting
- Reserve Force and Cadets

A. COMMAND AND CONTROL

The scope of opinions expressed on command and control encompasses the top echelon at National Defence Headquarters, the infrastructure supporting the top echelon, the Commands and other activities within this framework down to the unit level.

i) National Defence Headquarters

The general thrust of opinions was that there had been insufficient sea, land and air environmental expertise available to the senior decision makers in the councils in which they served.

It has been held that the Commanders of the three environmental Commands acted as advisors only when asked for advice and that consultation usually occurred after a major decision had been made. The Commanders of Maritime Command, Mobile Command, and Air Command were not seen as being involved in the day-to-day resolution of environmental problems, as representing their forces when decisions are made affecting personnel under their command, or as having a voice in the administration of centralized systems such as personnel and materiel.

The positions of the Chief of Maritime Doctrine and Operations, the Chief of Land Doctrine and Operations and the Chief of Air Doctrine and Operations were not perceived to meet the requirement for environmental representation at National Defence Headquarters where it was felt that this should include the experience of field command at the most senior level.

From outside National Defence Headquarters, the chain of command was perceived as being blurred. The opinion expressed was that many communications to National Defence Headquarters from command units by-passed the command headquarters and in other cases, the command acted only as a "clearing-house" for information. The majority of the decision making was seen to be done at National Defence Headquarters.

Senior personnel both at National Defence Headquarters and in the field were concerned about the advice given to the Minister of National Defence with respect to navy, army and air force procurement programs and other matters of policy execution, administration and organization. The viewpoint frequently expressed in this regard was that the senior sailor, soldier and airman should have access to the Minister of National Defence where matters concerning their forces have not been resolved to their satisfaction.

National Defence Headquarters was viewed as not being responsive to operational requirements. For example, it was observed that there had been insufficient attention to tactical doctrine formulation at the National Defence Headquarters level. A Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was frequently advanced as an appropriate solution to a perceived lack of environmental sensitivity in the present headquarters structure.

In general, the opinions stressed the need to retain the centralized personnel and materiel systems in recognition of the economic benefits

derived from this form of centralization. It was stressed, however, that these systems must be more responsive to the unique requirements of the navy, army and air force and, to this end, senior environmental representation was thought to be required at National Defence Headquarters.

Opinions concerning command and control were expressed by serving officers, generally in the rank of Colonel or equivalent and above, and by retired officers of general officer rank. Associations also contributed opinions on command and control. A Joint Chiefs of Staff system was supported by a majority of opinions expressed by these witnesses. In particular this system received support from retired general officers who had served in the highest positions in the unified structure, as well as from a majority of general officers who are presently serving.

Views in support of the existing organization were also expressed. Such views held that during the period of resource constraint, the existing system was successful in ensuring the survival of the Canadian Forces and in allocating scarce funding under appropriate strict controls.

ii) Organizational Structure

Suggestions for modifications to the National Defence Headquarters organizational structure were included in much of the testimony concerning command and control. Whatever the suggested form of organization of top echelon, it was represented that it should be designed in such a manner that the military is seen to be in charge of a military organization.

iii) The Staff System

The lack of a common, well defined staff system has been a subject of concern for army officers. They perceived that the existing structure was not supporting the army's requirements and was in violation of a number of military organizational principles. The criticism centered on National Defence Headquarters and the presumed prevailing influence of civilian management philosophy and techniques. Weaknesses in the decision making process were attributed to the lack of an appropriate staff system. Members of the navy and air force did not express as much concern in this respect although there were problems cited particularly in technical matters.

iv) Civilianization

Many opinions have been expressed regarding a perceived civilianization of National Defence Headquarters. It has been held that at the Assistant Deputy Minister level, civilians were making or were contributing to the making of decisions of a military nature and that control by the civil power should not mean control by the Public Service. It was alleged that the proportion of civilians in National Defence Headquarters had increased in relation to the proportion of military personnel. Some witnesses claimed that too many decisions affecting the daily lives of service personnel were being made by civilians who were not

sufficiently familiar with the details of service life. The co-chairmanship of the Defence Management Committee has been criticized, the observation being that it should be chaired by the Chief of the Defence Staff. It was also held that this perceived civilianization had resulted in a loss of focus on the "sharp end". There was a widespread feeling within the Canadian Forces outside National Defence Headquarters that the seemingly large number of civilians involved in the decision making process in National Defence Headquarters had civilianized the approach to military problems. It was felt that civilian "rank" and "job tenure" acted to the detriment of the influence of serving military personnel who were frequently moved from one position to another.

v) Scientific Advisor

Representations were made by some that a scientific advisor was required in the National Defence Headquarters organization. This function instead of being divided and submerged should be established with regular, visible participation at the policy formulation and senior decision making level.

vi) Regional Command System

Many officers expressed dissatisfaction with the regional command system. While they generally agreed that the system had permitted a great reduction in the number of headquarters, it introduced an additional and separate chain of command and it created difficulties with manpower utilization because of additional regional requirements. Many army officers, as well as a number of air and naval officers, considered that since Mobile Command was the primary source of support to Canadian Forces responses to regional crises and was the most capable regional headquarters to direct land forces, the responsibility for the regional system should be given to the army. Officers with experience in responding to regional crises considered that both planning and reaction would be better coordinated by a Mobile Command regional command system, as Mobile Command and its subordinate organizations generally had to assume on-the-spot control, arrange troop deployment and provide the appropriate equipment and specialties. Air-sea rescue was generally accepted as an appropriate responsibility for the two naval headquarters while air search and rescue would remain under the control of Air Command. It was felt that special situations requiring overall direction, for example, the Cosmos 954 recovery, could be dealt with on an ad hoc basis.

vii) The Base Concept

The base system was viewed as an air force concept. The adoption of the base concept was held to have adversely affected the operational effectiveness of the army and to have been unsuitable for the navy.

The army opinions focused on the question of support to mobile units. It was represented that support services at the base were double-tasked in that personnel were assigned to support both the base and the operational units when deployed. This double-tasking had made operations and training extremely difficult for army units. It was stated

that either the operational requirements deprived the base of necessary support or that base requirements denied support to the operational unit. It was held that the service battalions should be disassociated from the base support and should be more closely committed to the support of mobile operational units.

The supply system was viewed as being generally efficient. It was considered that it offered substantial economies as a result of the consolidation of supply depots and the merger of inventories. Many favourable comments referred to the improvements made in the provision of materiel to the operational units in the navy and to air force base activities. There was a general consensus that this centralized activity must be retained.

The opinion was frequently expressed, however, that the supply system for the army did not extend beyond the base. To properly support mobile units away from the base, supply procedures must be developed and the system must be adequately manned by trained personnel.

From the navy point of view, it was observed that the two dockyards, presently lodger units at the Canadian Forces Bases Halifax and Esquimalt, are primarily industrial activities which support the fleet with repair and overhaul facilities. It was felt that placing them under base control had accomplished nothing more than an additional layer of administration and confusion to what had formerly been a straightforward chain of command. It was stated generally by the navy that there had been improvements in some areas as a result of the base concept, particularly in the provision of motor transport where both the quality and quantity had improved.

Depending on the base, on the number of lodger units supported by the base, and on its parent command, the base commander was subject to a confusing chain of command because he was seen to respond to too many demands and/or superiors.

viii) Unit Commanding Officers

Many army witnesses perceived an erosion of the authority and control of unit commanding officers. The main contributing factors to this erosion were believed to be the centralized personnel system and the implementation of the base concept.

It was the view of the army, and to some degree that of the navy, that there has also been an erosion of the unit commanding officer's ability to provide leadership. In this vein, it was stated that the commanding officer must be seen to be the leader. He should also be perceived as the source of advice and guidance on matters affecting the morale and well-being of the personnel under his command and as a focal point for the redress of grievances. The existence of support services which do not have unit affiliation at bases - that is social, legal, spiritual, and financial - has changed the image of the commanding officer in that he now had to refer his personnel to someone else. From a career and training point of view, the commanding officer had been supplanted by the career manager.

ix) Helicopter Air Detachments (Helairdets) Aboard Ship

The administrative and operational command and control of the Helairdets in ships was the subject of a number of opinions expressed to the Task Force. It was represented that since the establishment of Air Command in 1975 and the subsequent allocation of all flying equipment and air support equipment and facilities to Air Command, the necessary operational control required by the navy had suffered. The administrative control exercised by Air Command was believed to have affected the operational flying time at the disposal of the Commander, Maritime Command.

It was stated that the concept of flying helicopters from destroyers was developed and implemented by the navy to add new dimensions to the search and weapons capability of the ships. In the past, personnel flying and maintaining the helicopters were "sailors" who were at home both on the sea and in a ship; when not flying, they participated in the normal ship's routine. The description of the situation was that the "airmen" now manning the Helairdets were not trained to perform as sailors; their adjustment to shipboard life was difficult; they did not contribute to a cohesive ship's company; and, a number of them did not want to be there. Some, on the other hand, considered this to be a minor problem which could be solved with more effective leadership.

On the subject of command and control, it was observed that although the Commander, Maritime Command had operational control, it was affected by the Air Command control of flying hours for training, maintenance schedules and safety considerations. It was stated that under wartime conditions, the Commander, Maritime Command would have to exercise complete control of the Helairdets. It was held that operational effectiveness had been downgraded under the present system of shared responsibilities between the two Commands.

x) Mobilization

Many witnesses expressed their concern about the low priority given to mobilization planning. Some aspects of the Canadian Forces inability to mobilize were attributed to the lack of resources which had led to the depletion of such wartime stocks as ammunition, small arms and spare parts.

A considerable body of opinion suggested that the present unified structure could not adequately meet the requirements of mobilization. These opinions were qualified by the scenarios presented for mobilization: the more modest the degree and extent of mobilization required, the greater the possibility that it could be handled. The lack of a mobilization plan was cited as a serious deficiency and as an example of the lack of emphasis placed on operational matters.

It was observed that large scale mobilization for a protracted conventional type conflict would require a return to the three forces concept. According to some opinions, all activities from recruitment to environmental training would have to be conducted by each of the three services. The unified forces were described as being organized for a peacetime operation with a very limited mobilization capability.

Requirements for mobilization training were considered by operational personnel to contradict the philosophy of common training since the demand in an emergency would be for short specialty courses to produce in a minimum period of time an effective sailor, soldier or airman.

B. IDENTITY

Opinions on identity included dress, insignia, rank designation, nomenclature and recognition of environments, ships, squadrons, formations and units. They varied considerably depending on environment, trade/classification and affiliation with the operational or support elements.

Many serving personnel stressed a need for greater identity, for a return to some of the traditions of past achievements and for closer association with members of the Canadian Forces who have similar tasks and operate in the same environment. In this respect, there appeared to be a strong similarity of opinion between retired personnel and serving personnel, irrespective of whether enlistment was before or after unification.

In the opinion of most witnesses, uniforms for the Canadian Forces should have a strong Canadian identity to ensure that our military personnel are not mistaken for those of Great Britain, the United States or other nations. The great majority of naval personnel wished to have a dark blue naval walking out uniform; and to a lesser degree, members of the air force wanted to have a sky blue walking out uniform. While members of the army were generally satisfied with the present green uniform, particularly since they have achieved a considerable degree of identity through badging and insignia, they believed that this evolution of identity should continue. Favourable comments were made concerning army and air force combat clothing but many naval personnel expressed dissatisfaction with the safety and utility of their present working dress.

A large number of members of the support services wanted to be identified with an environment. It was their opinion that this environmental identity would give them a better identity than does that of the Canadian Forces as a whole. Some members of the support services, particularly those who have spent lengthy periods of time on static bases, were satisfied with a Canadian Forces identity.

Testimony concerning identity within the support services ranged from a preference for identity with the branches to a desire for identity with an environment or combinations of the two. Some personnel who have joined the Canadian Forces since unification expressed a desire to be identified with the navy, army or air force. Other opinions were in favour of branch identity as opposed to environmental identity. Some felt that it was an advantage to be able to serve in different environments.

Most medical, dental and postal personnel and chaplains did not wish to have specific environmental identity for their walking out uniforms. They felt that when they were serving with the combat elements, they would be wearing combat clothing and could be sufficiently identified as part of an environment at that time.

There was considerable criticism of the present badging system; many witnesses were of the opinion that the uniform was becoming too cluttered with badges and insignia, thereby appearing much less like a military

uniform. There seemed to be a desire for environmental rank insignia; some army officers preferred to have rank insignia on the shoulders, while naval officers preferred to have the "curl" on the stripe restored.

In dealing with present rank nomenclature, it became apparent that naval personnel would like to have naval rank nomenclature fully recognized throughout the Canadian Forces, whereas army and air force personnel were quite content with the present nomenclature. There appeared to be no desire on the part of serving air force personnel to return to the former officer rank nomenclature which had existed in the Royal Canadian Air Force.

A high proportion of serving individuals who had joined since unification expressed a desire for environmental identification and they stated emphatically that members of the Canadian Forces serving in a combat role wished to be recognized as either navy, army or air force. It was considered by many to be of great benefit, when serving with other military forces, to be clearly and quickly recognizable as members of the navy, army or air force.

There was a desire on the part of many serving members and other witnesses to see a chain of command identified by environment through to the top echelon of Canada's military organization. They felt a need for representation on the most senior military committees by someone who understood the specific environmental problems.

It was the opinion of most members of the support services that they did not wish to be recognized as members of a fourth service with a separate identity.

Although identity was a high priority in the opinions of many witnesses, most expressed the view that equipment should come first with identity as a secondary consideration.

Many support personnel expressed a desire to re-introduce trade badges.

Many serving personnel wanted to restore the former three separate services, although in most cases they wished to retain the benefits that were achieved through integration and unification. Some serving personnel and many other witnesses expressed a desire to have the names of the services restored to the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

In general naval personnel desired closer identification with the navy and the ships in which they serve; air force personnel desired closer identification with the air force as a whole; and army personnel desired more identity with the branch, regiment or unit of the land forces in which they were serving.

C. SUPPORT SERVICES

i) General

Many in the operational components and some in support services felt that members of the logistics, administration and finance groupings had lost sight of their primary role of providing support to the operational forces. It was also felt that there was a preoccupation with solving problems of branch identity.

The quality of support to operational units was severely criticized by some army witnesses. It was stressed that the lack of emphasis on environmental training produced logistic and finance personnel who did not have the necessary knowledge to operate under field conditions.

A requirement was perceived for environmental specialization and visible identification with operational units to restore a sense of pride in operational support, wherein support personnel would be recognized as members of operational units.

It was represented that the training emphasis within the support services for particular trades/classifications was directed toward the most frequent employment conditions with little recognition or regard for other service requirements.

Support personnel expressed a strong preference for serving at static bases, particularly air bases. Even support personnel who considered it advantageous to serve in any environment demonstrated a strong reluctance to serve in ships and with land units in the field.

ii) Career Opportunities

The majority of support services personnel believed that their career opportunities had been enhanced by unification. Others thought that there were some military occupations where dissimilar trade groupings such as metal technicians or security and intelligence were seen to impose restrictions on advancement or professional proficiency in the sense that it has limited the ability of these personnel to move within their trade from one environment to another.

It was also recognized that the support service structure had generally provided broader career opportunities for officers. In some categories, however, the opposite had occurred. One example cited was the situation created for military engineers. It was stated that field engineers were combined in the military engineer branch with all of the construction engineers and, since the field engineers were a minority of that branch, they competed for advancement on a branch basis which did not recognize their combat role. Field engineer officers considered that they were not identified with operational units and that they were in a classification which was more civilian than military. The field engineer officers considered that they should be in competition with combat arms officers for army operational appointments. A similar situation relating to field signals was described by some communications officers.

iii) Communication Command

There was general agreement among the witnesses that the Communication Branch and Communication Command have yielded significant economies and have given good service in terms of strategic communications and fixed communication services. It was also stated, however, that the Command, Branch School and career management within the branch had responded to the largest demand, that of fixed communications, at the expense of army field communications. It was believed that the branch could not support army field operations as well as the former Corps of Signals.

iv) General Opinions Concerning Support Services Organization

The general thrust of the testimony on the support services dealt with the perceived problems of identity, environmental training and retention of the benefits of integrated facilities. A major theme was that the knowledge required to perform effectively in all three environments could not be acquired by one individual. It was held that environmental specialization within the support services would increase the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces and correct the perceived alienation of the support services from the operational forces.

Some witnesses suggested that support personnel such as medical, chaplains, dental and postal, should be attached to one service; in most of these briefs, it was suggested that this should be the army. In addition, some witnesses expressed the view that unification had further enhanced the integration of these services.

D. TRAINING

Following enrolment all recruits receive an initial twelve weeks of recruit training prior to environmental or trades training. In the opinion of many, this recruit training constituted the lowest common denominator of the various service requirements. Many operational personnel expressed the view that time spent on initial recruit training could be better spent on specific environmental training. Most army and navy personnel considered early socialization in the environment to be important in order to indoctrinate the recruit into service life and to preclude a first impression which would not fit the environment to which he would be posted.

Many operational personnel were of the opinion that training time would be considerably reduced if initial recruit training and environmental training were combined. Alternatively, many suggested that recruits should be streamed during initial recruit training under instructors from the environment in which they are to serve.

The need for environmental training for personnel in the support services received considerable attention. Most witnesses stressed the importance of support personnel receiving adequate environmental training prior to serving with combat units. Some felt that support personnel should receive initial recruit training, trades training and then environmental training prior to posting. Others, particularly in the operational environments, were of the opinion that support personnel should be combat personnel first and trades personnel second, reflecting the view that all personnel should join the Canadian Forces to serve in an operational environment.

Most witnesses asserted that maximum use should be made of common infrastructure and that joint or integrated training, environmentally streamed, would not only make this possible but would also provide for an economic use of resources. Some were of the opinion that recruits should be trained separately by environment and in separate locations.

Many held the opinion that management was emphasized at the expense of leadership and, although the difference between management and leadership in training programs has been difficult to assess, the importance of leadership in combat units could not be overestimated.

Some expressed the opinion that the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College has filled a unique need in the development of army officers. Nevertheless, it was felt that this College was being increasingly downgraded and that action should be taken to restore course length and increase the prestige of the College. The Canadian Forces Staff College and Staff School were seen to have provided valuable joint education for junior and middle rank officers, as did the National Defence College for senior military and civilian officers.

There was general concern that group training was too frequently reduced or modified for administrative or financial reasons without adequate consideration of its impact on operational effectiveness. Examples were cited from all environments and included reductions in training flights, priority being given to individual training when in competition with group training, tasks viewed as non-military, and restrictions on fuel and ammunition.

E. THE PERSONNEL SYSTEM

The Canadian Forces has a highly centralized, computerized personnel system which handles all personnel promotions and postings through National Defence Headquarters. It was the opinion of many service personnel that the centralized system has had an adverse effect on leadership, and has eroded a commanding officer's ability to deal with his subordinates' personal problems. It was considered by many that the centralized personnel system elevated even minutiae to the National Defence Headquarters level, thereby leaving little or nothing to be resolved at the unit or command level.

It was felt that the personnel system could not meet mobilization requirements and that in the event of a large scale expansion of the Canadian Forces, it would be necessary to decentralize much of the existing system.

Opinions were expressed that cross-environment posting of individuals was detrimental to the efficiency of a unit. Personnel who were "cross-posted" from another environment took a considerable period of time to orient themselves to the new environment. During this time they were inefficient in performing their job and burdened the unit by having to be trained in environmental responsibilities and procedures. Many witnesses also felt that there was an inconsistency in personnel evaluation standards between environments which could be detrimental to the career of the cross-posted individual. On the other hand, some witnesses were of the opinion that cross-postings had an educational value by broadening both their experience and training.

It was noted that many static positions were filled by personnel who by reason of health, age or sex could not be posted to operational units, thereby decreasing the numbers and types of positions available to operational personnel on static relief duty. This was particularly noticeable in the navy where the sea/shore ratio has been such that many personnel have had to spend extended periods of service on sea duty. Many army personnel also commented on the lack of available static vacancies after operational postings.

There was some resentment expressed in the Canadian Forces that promotion was frequently used as an inducement to circumvent the consent-to-serve/vested rights of individuals who had joined prior to unification. Another source of resentment mentioned was the practice of using a promotion to persuade an individual to accept an undesirable posting, particularly to an environment in which he did not wish to serve. This latter comment was expressed by personnel who have enrolled since unification and who did not have vested rights to protect them against service in those environments in which they did not wish to serve. However, it was recognized by some that this had introduced a greater flexibility in the system.

Many considered that the common rank structure disregarded the differences in environments and created superfluous ranks within some environments. It was observed that the implementation of a uniform rank structure had distorted the rank structure and had diluted the significance of some ranks.

Some testimony indicated that the equal opportunity principle which had been applied to branches of the Canadian Forces had led to inflated rank pyramids for some branches, trades or classifications. To provide equal opportunity for members of small specialties, a number of specialties have had to be amalgamated to create a large enough rank pyramid. In the process some specialties have been artificially merged, for example, the merger of military police and intelligence functions. This has created senior rank levels in excess of the requirements in certain specialties.

Many expressed the opinion that rank should be associated with leadership rather than with skill or trade. It was felt that rank should be related to the granting of authority over other individuals and should not be used to provide a higher pay level for skilled tradesmen.

It was considered by many that the present common terms of service did not meet the requirements of all environments; each environment had its own requirements for rank structure and for service career patterns. Prior to unification, environments had used short service commissions and varying terms of service to meet their own requirements.

It was held that the one person/one job policy was damaging to operational units because it did not provide for sufficient flexibility within the system to use personnel to maximum effectiveness.

It was the opinion of many support personnel that their career prospects had been enhanced by the opportunity to serve in other environments. However, some others felt that such prospects were made possible only at the expense of army combat and naval personnel who had a reduced number of sea/shore billets to which they could be posted because support service personnel were now filling the vacancies.

It was the opinion of many that the military trade structure of the Canadian Forces was a reflection of the civilian labour force and that some serving personnel were becoming civilians in uniform with a nine-to-five attitude toward work. It was felt that parity with the Public Service had downgraded the military ethic and that a potential for unionization existed within the Canadian Forces.

F. RECRUITING

At the present time a recruit in the Canadian Forces is enrolled in a trade. Many witnesses were concerned with the inability of the Canadian Forces to respond to an applicant's preference for a particular environment. Some expressed the view that there should be provision for enrolment in an environment with trade as a secondary consideration. Some others expressed the view that today's youth joined the Canadian Forces for a variety of reasons, including that of obtaining a job or trade and that environmental considerations were secondary.

According to some testimony, advice on details of service life and on trade specifications and opportunities had been inaccurate or provided the applicant with insufficient knowledge to make a valid career choice. It was observed that designations for some trades effectively masked their real meaning for an applicant. As an example, a mobile support equipment operator is the Canadian Forces nomenclature for a driver.

Many serving witnesses commented on the difficulties of remustering to their first trade choice. They were of the opinion that false expectations had been raised at the time of enrolment and that in reality, the potential for remustering was rather limited and in some areas virtually non-existent. Furthermore, record of their preference at the time of their enrolment may have been lost in the system, with the result that when vacancies did occur, they were overlooked.

G. THE RESERVE FORCE AND CADETS

i) Source of Opinions

Although Regular Force personnel have contributed opinions concerning the Reserve Force and cadets, the majority of opinions have originated from sponsoring or interested associations and individuals from the Naval Reserve, the Air Reserve, the Militia and the cadets.

ii) The Reserve Force

It was represented that the Reserve Force was in a dilemma as its *raison d'être* depended upon a mobilization plan. Its present role of individual augmentation of the Regular Force to war establishment was not seen to satisfy the Militia. This role was held to be contrary to the principles of the regimental system. Also, it would deprive them of the nucleus of personnel who would be essential to their growth in time of crisis.

Opinions from the Naval Reserve and the Air Reserve indicated that their loss of identity was a serious impediment to their growth and maintenance of high standards. They saw a blurred public perception of the Reserve Force owing to the common uniform which had resulted in a lessening of their ability to appeal to the public for support at the community level.

The elimination of the Canadian Officer Training Corps and the University Naval Training Division programs was cited as having contributed to the critical shortage of trained junior officers.

It was stated that Militia units operated under a split command. For example, some Militia units were supported by the Commander of Maritime Command for day-to-day matters but under the command of Mobile Command for operational matters. The perceived conflict of responsibility was attributed to the present command system. It was stated that all Militia units should be under the command of the nearest army Regular Force headquarters for day-to-day operations or, alternately that a Militia headquarters should be re-established.

It was contended that there was fragmentation of operational control over the Air Reserve because two reserve wings composed of four squadrons came under Mobile Command, one squadron under Maritime Command, and two wings composed of two squadrons under Air Command.

The budgetary limitations on authorized strength were held to have an adverse effect on the size of the Militia, the Naval, Air and Communication Reserve units. It was also stated that small numbers in the Militia reduced the opportunity for both non-commissioned officers and officers to conduct training with numbers of troops appropriate to their rank.

Representatives of the Naval and Air Reserves expressed concern over the requirement to adopt personnel administrative and financial procedures which were appropriate for the Militia, but were both labour intensive and irrelevant to the assigned roles of the Naval and Air Reserves.

The Air Reserve represented that as it was functioning as an air auxiliary, it should be so recognized. The imposition of an establishment and budget solely for training failed to recognize that Air Reserve squadrons were trained to Regular Force standards and indeed performed Regular Force flying tasks on the same duty basis.

All Reserve Force and Militia representations referred to the constraints in funding, the lack of equipment, the obsolescence of their equipment, and the lack of opportunity for training with Regular Force units.

iii) Cadets

Presentations to the Task Force concerning the cadet movement stressed that its goal was the development of desired qualities of citizenship and leadership among Canadian youth. As a side effect, cadets provided a substantial number of recruits to the Regular and Reserve Forces.

The imposition of a common green cadet uniform, described as a working dress, was represented as being a detrimental step striking at the basic attractions of the three cadet organizations. It was held that the common uniform has destroyed much of the appeal which the Cadet Corps had formerly possessed and that a return to distinctive uniforms was of utmost importance to them. It was stated that cadet programs functioned best when they were clearly identified with the navy, army or air force. The primary support for cadets was described as being from interested associations, such as the Navy League, which have fostered the growth of local cadet units.

The base system was described as providing first rate support to the cadets.

SECTION VI

UNIFICATION 1979: PROBLEMS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE

The main part of the mandate of the Task Force was to examine the merits and disadvantages of unification.

The term "merits and disadvantages" implies an abstract discussion on the merits and disadvantages within the framework of an ideal type of organizational structure. The "merits and disadvantages" of such an approach would impose a comparison with some given standard of achievement. It is this inability to compare with that which existed before unification, or that which exists elsewhere, that is a major problem. In addition it would impose an item-by-item review of the perceived merits and disadvantages with analysis and judgement applied to each. It is the view of the Task Force that this is not practical owing to the interrelationships that exist among the many areas for examination.

It is considered useful to review the goals of unification as originally stated although this will not be conclusive in terms of an audit of unification.

It is evident, however, from a review of Section V, that problems within the unified structure can be identified. It is the opinion of the Task Force that these problems in the unified structure must be analysed in the context of the appropriate area or activity in which they arise. In doing so, the Task Force will discuss each problem followed by its conclusions and recommendations.

B. 1979 REVIEW OF GOALS OF UNIFICATION

The goals of unification are stated in Section II. It is the aim of this section to review these goals and record conclusions concerning achievement or non-achievement. The goals were:

- Financial Savings
- Increased Operational Effectiveness
- Common Identity in the Canadian Forces
- Enhanced Career Opportunities

These goals are set forth in Section II and restated below in paraphrase form.

i) Financial Savings

It was recognized at the time of unification that the total funds available for defence were not likely to change. Therefore, there would be a decline in the purchasing power of money available for capital equipment. To offset this decline, emphasis was to be placed on reducing manpower costs associated with headquarters, training and similar establishments, and savings had to be made on reducing operating and maintenance expenses without impairing operational efficiency. Elimination of duplication and triplication of functions was a main theme for unification of the Canadian Forces.

ii) Increased Operational Effectiveness

At the decision making level, the emphasis was to be changed in order that policies and plans concerning defence programs and spending would be made on the basis of Canada's total military needs, rather than the needs of an individual service. Conflicting loyalties and competition would be eliminated allowing for more objective assessment of defence requirements.

Unification was to provide swifter decision making and reaction time concomitant with the nature of modern warfare and its characteristic compaction of time and distance. The pattern of warfare in which armies fought armies, navies fought navies and air forces fought air forces was not likely to be repeated.

Greater flexibility to meet changing requirements would be provided by a unified force. This flexibility would be necessary in order to take advantage of rapid advances in military technology and changes in the international situation. Expensively trained personnel could be employed more efficiently in a unified force when changes in roles or systems altered requirements.

iii) Common Identity in the Canadian Forces

Common identity was intended to create an overriding loyalty to the whole force and its total objectives on behalf of Canada. The recognizable dividing lines among navy, army and air force had long since disappeared and, therefore, it was imperative that there be a higher loyalty beyond that given to a particular service.

iv) Enhanced Career Opportunities

More challenging and rewarding careers were to be offered to officers and other ranks by the removal of artificial barriers created by the three services. Greater opportunities would be provided for the development and employment of skills and professional talent because the removal of former service barriers would provide greater avenues for service and more opportunity for personal advancement. Servicemen would not be converted to "jacks-of-all-trades".

v) Conclusions

The Task Force concludes the following with respect to the attainment of the goals stated above.

As indicated in Section III, the resource constraints had a significant effect on manning and equipping the Canadian Forces. In addition, the various changes in structures and functions are reflected in a series of non-comparable accounting figures. The Task Force has, therefore, found it impossible to identify the aggregate savings that may be attributable solely to unification. Some areas where general savings may have been realized, such as the elimination of duplication or triplication of staff and facilities, will be discussed under some of the discrete headings in this section.

At the National Defence Headquarters level, unification was expected to produce substantial personnel savings. In 1964, there were 3,261 military and 4,486 civilian personnel at headquarters; in 1979, there were 3,083 military and 4,317 civilians, a reduction of 178 military and 169 civilians.¹ In total this represented a reduction of 347 personnel accounting for less than 5 percent of the 1964 total. This trend was contrary to the relative increase in personnel which has taken place in most of the other departments of the Canadian government since the mid-sixties. It is questionable, however, whether the small decrease in National Defence Headquarters personnel can be attributed solely to unification, when during the same period, the overall reduction of military personnel was 34 percent and for civilian personnel, 20 percent.

It also must be observed that personnel associated with particular functions were moved in and out of headquarters, with the result that there is no way of determining whether or not there were any overall savings associated with any personnel cuts at National Defence Headquarters.

¹Department of National Defence data.

In reviewing the goal of "increased operational effectiveness" it is obvious that financial constraints have made it impossible in some instances to adequately equip the Canadian Forces with modern equipment. Operational land units are undermanned, aircraft are in reserve because of financial restraints, and ships have been placed in reserve because of the manpower shortage.

If operational effectiveness is meant to cover the quality and efficiency of the Canadian Forces with regard to the fulfilment and achievement of the tasks that they have undertaken, the Task Force is of the opinion that they perform extremely well. This will be further elaborated in a following sub-section.

There is no conclusive evidence to show whether or not the goal of achieving swifter decision making or swifter reaction capability has been attained.

Increased flexibility, as it pertains to employment of support personnel, has been achieved but not without a loss in efficiency because cross-environmental employment for support personnel has increased on-job training required to make them effective after they arrive in an operational unit.

With the establishment of Air Command in 1975, the command structure consisted of four commands: Maritime, Mobile, Air, and Communication Commands. Communication Command appears to be the only functional command remaining as the others are environmental. It is difficult to ascertain whether or not the establishment of six functional commands was designed to achieve more flexibility within the organization, or to develop a field command structure more suitable to meet the military roles outlined for the Canadian Forces, or to realize savings. For all practical purposes, these goals can be interpreted as pertaining to the achievement of a unified force structure. The structural changes which have since occurred at the Command level make it difficult to assess the flexibility of the command structure, as it is only one of many criteria against which effectiveness could be measured.

The evolutionary process which has been evident for the past four to five years has brought about some other changes to the unified force concept. A review of support personnel classifications, commencing in 1975, brought about some changes to classifications. Those changes were intended to correct low morale and to address environmental training problems and the field/static ratios. Concessions to requests for environmental and unit identity were also made by approving badges and insignia to be worn on the common green uniform. For the army this process eventually allowed distinctive identity to reach down to the unit level. For the navy and air force and for a large number of members of the support services, these concessions have not satisfied the need for identity with the environment, branch, or trade/classification.

Career opportunities for members of the support services have been enhanced for some trades/classifications but for the operational personnel there has been little change. On the contrary, the assignment of support personnel to formerly "open" non-operational positions has had an adverse effect on the field/static and sea/shore ratios in the army and navy. Among the support services, there is a clear orientation away from their prime objective of support to the operational forces.

SUMMARY

It is dubious whether unification has achieved the intended goals. In some instances, the Task Force felt it could not compare the situation in 1979 to what existed before. In other instances, it had no hard evidence on which it could base its judgement. Finally, it is to be noted that there has been an evolution in the application of the policy of unification, which has made it more than difficult to relate the present form of unification to the stated goals.

The Task Force felt that the best way to meet its mandate was to identify a series of discrete problems on which it could make concrete recommendations.

C. PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1) The Support Services

Discussion

This discussion of the support services will include the central supply system, training, promotion, and conditions of service as applied to the members of the support services who comprise approximately 60 percent of the personnel now serving in the Canadian Forces.

The integration of some of the services and facilities, common to all three services, undoubtedly created savings in some areas. An example is the supply system which consolidated the supply depots, reduced the numbers of personnel required to operate them, and reduced the overall inventory. The integration of staffs in some of the other common services also may have been beneficial in terms of saving manpower and dollars.

The objective of the support services and the trades and classifications embraced by those services, was and remains that of support to the operational units of the Canadian Forces. It is in the quality of that support to the operational units and the orientation of the personnel in the support trades/classifications that problems are found.

Training for support personnel is not environmentally directed. It is devoted to producing personnel qualified in a trade or classification to the lowest common denominator in considering the requirements of the navy, army and air force. To adequately support operational units to which they may be assigned and to serve with those units, support personnel must have the basic skills required for working and surviving in that environment. As support personnel do not have these basic skills, they must undergo on-job training when they join the unit. This has a cost both in terms of additional training time for the trainees and in loss of time from primary tasks for those who instruct them in how to perform as sailors, soldiers or airmen. The problem is more acute when considered in the context of career progression where increasing environmental capability should be realized but the opportunity for doing so is not provided.

The creation of what amounts to a fourth service, and the identification of its members with a support branch rather than an operational unit or force, has created a rift between the supporters and the operators. While the emphasis on operations has declined, the branch has become the focal point for its members. The role of support is poorly understood by support personnel. For example, while they are intended to support the operational forces, they wish to do it from static bases. It is not unusual to find that a logistician, for example, does not wish to serve in a ship (which is a least desirable posting) or a field unit (which is the next least desirable).

The erosion in the provision of operational support to the army is of particular concern. The supply system stops at the base and there is no established system for providing forward support to field units. Supply personnel are not adequately trained in the provision of support either to or in field units.

The consolidation of supply depots into four major facilities has increased the average time required to transport materiel to a unit or base. It has limited the locations of storage areas for materiel which in some cases increases transportation costs. Also the supply system does not have the basic capability to deal with supply on an integrated component basis rather than on an items basis only. For example, the system cannot produce a listing of spare parts applicable to a specific system - this information is manually maintained.

The communications branch has emphasized the fixed communications requirement at the expense of field operations, reducing its ability to meet the field signals requirements of the operational land units.

Conclusions

The lack of emphasis on environmental training for members of the support services trades and classifications has produced personnel without the necessary environmental knowledge to perform adequately under operational conditions.

Preoccupation with solving problems of branch identity amongst communications, logistics, administrative and engineering personnel has led to a loss of an operational orientation.

There is a lack of flexibility in the supply system to provide first-line support for field units.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

1. the common central support systems be retained
2. support services personnel rotate between the central systems and their particular environment

It is intended that posting across environmental lines be eliminated. An individual will rotate between only one environment and the central system except for those who volunteer for cross-postings or for those necessary to meet special personnel requirements. This recommendation would meet the needs both of maintaining expertise in the central system and retaining flexibility in the personnel posting cycle. Exclusions from the central/environmental posting cycle could well be medical, dental, postal, legal and chaplain personnel.

3. direction be given to address the recognized inadequacies in the supply system including organization, depot locations, system/component relationships and first-line support to field units

The Task Force realizes that these problems have been the subject of previous departmental studies wherein the implications have been explored, and trusts that this detailed knowledge will be used to speed their resolution.

ii) Personnel System

Discussion

The centralized personnel system serves all elements of the Canadian Forces. The Task Force considers it to be a highly efficient management system. However, there are several areas within this system that do not enhance the operational capability of the Canadian Forces. The first of these is the issue of cross-posting of support personnel between environments. This has an effect on morale both of the individual and the unit. In addition there is an effect on both the unit efficiency which results from the individual's lack of specific knowledge and the requirement for the unit to train him. (See also discussion under Support Services).

From the individual's point of view, support personnel posted for the first time to navy, army or air units find themselves at a disadvantage when compared with others who have been serving in their primary environment or who have received on-job training. Depending upon the rank involved this can be a serious problem. If the individual is a senior non-commissioned officer, his lack of environmental training is a handicap in doing his job of supervising and instructing others. His performance evaluation report would judge his performance in relation to his peers, which may well be to his disadvantage.

When unification was introduced, it was not the intent to convert servicemen to "jacks-of-all-trades". However, in the support services this has happened with the result that support to the operational forces is inadequate.

Another problem is that of offering promotion inducement to personnel to gain their acceptance of an undesirable posting. For example, this approach has been used to get static base personnel to serve in ships and in army field units. Promotion by this means is damaging to the morale of other personnel who are already serving in these environments and who may also be due for promotion. The fact that inducement is required would indicate that the cross-posting system has worked to the disadvantage of the operational units as personnel introduced to static base environments often show a preference for remaining there.

With the integration of supply, financial and administrative personnel, the personnel pyramid has been enlarged thereby creating enhanced career opportunities, but at the same time inflating rank levels.

The primary beneficiaries of enhanced career opportunities through the principle of equal opportunity for promotion have been the personnel in the support services and in particular in the logistic branch. The combat arms, sea and air environmental trades personnel have been employed much as they were prior to unification, and little change to career opportunities has been evident in these areas.

The application of the equal opportunity principle to all trades and classifications has created an imbalance between operations personnel and support personnel, with respect to the senior non-commissioned officer and officer rank structures, thereby diluting the influence of operations personnel.

The rank structure common to the navy, army and air force is not suitable for all of the forces. In all three environments the loss of an effective Corporal through automatic promotion to that rank has meant a reduction of responsibilities assigned to rank. For example, a Sergeant or a Petty Officer is now assigned responsibilities formerly given to a Corporal or Leading Seaman. There are also too many non-commissioned officer ranks for the navy to suit the employment of sailors in a ship.

The association of rank and trade skill in some cases has resulted in promotion which recognizes progression in trade skill only. This does not always cater to the requirement for leadership skills which should be inherent in rank.

The unsatisfactory ratio of operations versus static base employment creates a hardship for environmental sea and land personnel. Base positions are occupied in large measure by support personnel. Generally, this limits operational personnel in the navy and army to operational positions. Shore billets which were formerly used to provide some relief from sea duty for naval personnel, such as shore patrol and vehicle drivers, are now held by specific trades, for example, military police and mobile support equipment operators (drivers). If static employment is available for navy personnel, it will probably be at a base well removed from the sailor's home base and, if he is married, he faces separation from his family unless they are moved with him. A somewhat similar situation exists in the army.

The centralized system has created an imbalance between the career management aspects of the system and the collective needs of the units, thereby eroding the leadership capabilities of the unit commanding officer. This problem exists primarily in the army and is reflected in the unit commanding officer's reduced ability to deal directly with those under his command in matters concerning their personal problems and careers. The commanding officer must refer members of his unit to base staff for advice and information concerning social, spiritual and financial problems. The base staff tendering such advice do not come under the authority of the commanding officer and they maintain and have custody of the pertinent personnel records. In some cases such records are not available to the commanding officer, consequently his knowledge of the handling and disposition of matters affecting his personnel is often limited. This situation places the commanding officer in the position of being unable to redress grievances, although he still maintains the power to punish.

In the case of promotions and postings, whether for training or other purposes, the career manager has supplanted the commanding officer as the advisor to unit personnel and is the person who has the ultimate responsibility in these areas. This situation does not recognize that it is the commanding officer who is responsible for maintaining the efficiency of his unit and for meeting unit commitments.

Conclusions

Cross-posting of personnel between environments is detrimental to the efficiency of operational units. Unless it occurs voluntarily, it can result in a dissatisfied serviceman.

Promotion as an inducement to accept an undesirable posting has caused much resentment.

Equal opportunity for promotion has created an imbalance between operations personnel and support personnel.

The common rank structure has created rank distortions in the army and air force. It also has created superfluous ranks for the navy and a junior leadership problem for the army.

The association of rank with trade skill has diluted the authority of leadership of non-commissioned officers.

The unsatisfactory sea/shore or field/static ratio has adversely affected the conditions of service for operations personnel.

Unit leadership has been adversely affected by the orientation of the career management system towards individuals as opposed to the collective needs of units.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

4. cross-postings between environments be used only for volunteers or to meet special personnel requirements
5. offering promotions as an inducement to personnel to accept undesirable postings be avoided
6. the rank structure for non-commissioned officers be re-examined

The purpose of this latter recommendation is to satisfy the needs of each of the environments with respect to the number of other rank levels required and to re-establish the authority which was formerly associated with the Corporal rank.

7. the existing study of the separation of rank and trade skill be accorded a high priority

This is recommended to accommodate the unique needs of each environment and to ensure that leadership requirements are duly accounted for.

8. a more balanced sea/shore and field/static ratio be developed for navy and army operations personnel

One suggestion to achieve this objective is to transfer a portion of non-technical positions, such as drivers and military policemen, from "hard" to "open", thereby allowing these positions to be filled by operational personnel on static employment.

9. greater reliance be placed on the formal lines of authority within the chain of command between the central personnel system and the unit commanders

This recommendation is made with a view to redressing the imbalance that exists between the needs of the unit and the needs of the individual.

iii) Training

Discussion

Common recruit training, as conducted at Cornwallis, is unsatisfactory for operational personnel. Following common recruit training, environmental training must be given by the Fleet School and in the army operational unit to which the recruit is assigned. It is recognized that in most cases the current system imposes a longer period of training time than would be needed if operational personnel entered environmental training initially. At present, personnel for all three environments receive some training that may not be needed for their future employment.

The Task Force recognizes the need for early environmental socialization and has found that this does not exist to a sufficient degree within the common recruit training structure.

Environmental training for support services personnel has been discussed in this section under the sub-heading of Support Services. Trades and classification training is adequate for requirements of the central support systems but does not meet specialized environmental needs.

A low priority is given to collective training. The lack of resources assigned to group training imposes restrictions on unit training in ships, land units and air units. The funds for fuel and ammunition have not been made available for the scale of group training necessary to achieve required professional standards.

Conclusions

Environmental training, indoctrination and socialization processes are not sufficiently emphasized in recruit training.

Support services personnel receive inadequate environmental training prior to serving with combat units.

Collective operational training at the sub-unit, unit and formation levels has been degraded by support inadequacies, priorities which have been placed on individual training, and lack of resources.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

10. sea, land and air operational trades personnel undergo environmental training and socialization during both recruit and trades training
11. environmental training take advantage where practicable of existing common training facilities such as Cornwallis, St Jean, Borden and Chilliwack
12. greater emphasis be placed on environmental training for support services personnel
13. greater priority be given to collective training

iv) Recruiting

Discussion

On enrolment, some recruits misunderstand the implications of the choices offered and selected. Although recruiters are generally precise and honest in describing the implications of choices, they cannot always have first-hand experience in the trades or in the conditions of service involved. The recruits face a strange terminology, a complex structure, and trade choices that are not clear to them. They may arrive at the recruit schools with preconceived notions and tend to recall selectively from their interviews.

While the operational trades clearly involve environmental specialization, the support trades do not. The recruiting system accepts applicants into these support trades but there is no provision for recognizing and supporting the applicant's preference for service in a specific environment. Since unification, a number of members of the Canadian Forces have enrolled with a strong environmental preference in mind and would be much happier today if there had been a mechanism for responding to their preference.

Applicants often are not able to enrol into the precise trade or employment conditions they seek and thus have to choose another that appears less attractive. Trade reassignment programs do exist and recruiters frequently mention them to induce the recruit to accept the less attractive choices available. The recruiters suggest that the candidate apply later, while in service, for reassignment to the preferred trade or employment. This possibility is often more remote than recruiters imply, thereby raising false expectations.

Conclusions

The unified Canadian Forces recruiting system does not allow applicants for the support trades to join an environment of their choice.

Applicants misunderstand the trade reassignment possibilities.

Recommendation

It is recommended that:

14. the Canadian Forces continue with common recruiting by trade but with greater attention to environmental preferences

Other recommendations of this Task Force as a rule limit operational service with one environment. The recommendation above will permit a more precise description of terms of service and may also diminish the frequency of false expectations which may have been generated by the possibility of trade reassignment.

v) Base Concept

Discussion

The air force base concept was selected for the Canadian Forces base system. All bases were to reflect this standard model in the organization of the staff functions of operations, training, personnel, logistics and finance. The base commander was expected to direct and coordinate the use of resources according to this model. Routine administration would be dealt with directly between the staffs of group principals in National Defence Headquarters and base staffs, leaving operational commanders at all levels free to direct environmental training and operations. It was originally intended that administration in terms of personnel management, pay services, financial services, welfare services, amenities, transportation, supply and maintenance, would be controlled by the base commander.

In the application of the base concept after unification, Canadian Forces control was to be executed from top to bottom along functional lines. The bases were to be grouped under commands according to primary base activity. The personnel management system dealt with individuals; the supply system was to operate along its own organizational lines; maintenance was directed from National Defence Headquarters, as were the medical services, messes and clubs, and construction.

In the course of the application of the base concept, the base commander had to meet new demands. In some cases, he had to support units over which he had no operational control. The different sources of operational control and administrative control applicable to some units, and the overlapping of some administrative functions emanating from both the base commander and the line of command authority, have introduced unnecessary confusion into the system.

The application of the base concept has raised problems for all environments. This has been most significant for army bases, but problems exist to a lesser degree for the navy and air bases as well.

In the case of the navy, the base is no longer dedicated solely to its requirements. There have been difficulties in coordinating the base, fleet schools, dockyard, ship repair unit, and the ships in service. This has been eased, however, by the close physical proximity of the Command Headquarters.

In the case of the air force, the base concept has not created significant problems except when dealing with units of other commands.

In the case of the army, the unit commanding officer is often placed in the position where he must seek, in competition with other units, the support of the base specialists who tend to serve the common good of the base as a priority over the needs of his unit. In the case of bases of other commands supporting army units, some unit resources have been subordinated to the needs of the base.

The combat group service battalions are tasked to provide base services as well as field support, which is commonly referred to as "double-hatting". This has degraded the service battalion capacity to perform effectively in the field, because it can never be fully released for field training and has little time for training its personnel or sub-units.

The base concept was implemented for economic reasons. It is a tribute to participants that the system has worked as well as it has. However, the Task Force recognizes that the centralized administration of services has raised problems as regards co-ordination, manpower and multi-tasking. In some instances, this has been offset by the unofficial transfer of functions from the base commander to unit commanding officers and it has enabled these commanding officers to fulfill their responsibility more effectively.

Conclusions

The base concept, as the focus of activity under the principle of centralized administration of resources, is in contradiction with the traditional principle of unity of command.

Bases are unable to give adequate support to army operational units.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

15. more flexibility be exercised in the application of the base concept for the army in such matters as personnel administration, pay and social services
16. more resources be devoted to solution of the "double-hatting" problem of the army service battalions
17. further consideration be given to the departmental study evaluating the Canadian Forces base system

vi) Mobilization

Discussion

The Task Force has encountered some confusion in the definition of mobilization, as degrees of mobilization will be dictated by the specific emergency conditions. In this report, the term "augmentation" will be used to describe bringing the Canadian Forces to war establishment, and the term "mobilization" for bringing the Canadian Forces to a level of manning beyond war establishment.

There are a number of problems to be faced if the need for augmentation of the Regular Force arises.

The Militia, in particular, may not produce the numbers required as it is currently under strength, and for various reasons, many who serve in the Militia could not respond to a call to service.

Training in the Militia is inadequate and the equipment, where it is available, is obsolete. The Regular Force may not be in a position to undertake the additional training requirements for the Militia as it would be responding to a situation of emergency. This means that even for augmentation purposes, if time allows, the training system may be severely taxed and a large training program may have to be undertaken.

Other reserve personnel - that is, navy, air force and communications - when called up will require further training which will add to the total training system load.

The inadequacies of the central supply and personnel systems in peacetime have been commented on elsewhere. Any current inadequacy will be magnified if there is a requirement for augmentation.

Mobilization as defined above will accentuate those problems and is likely to overwhelm the training and the central personnel system.

The Task Force is aware of the current Department of National Defence study on mobilization and therefore recognizes that this problem is being addressed.

Conclusions

The Task Force recognizes that low priority has been given to augmentation plans.

There is doubt as to the ability of the training system, the common recruiting system and the unified structure to cope with augmentation/mobilization.

Current defence policy does not include a mobilization plan.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

18. the highest priority be given to the subject of mobilization planning
19. the current National Defence Headquarters study on mobilization deal with all of the problems defined above including those aspects that go beyond augmentation: the organizational structure of the Reserve Force, the viability of a common training structure, and the ability of a unified structure to respond to mobilization

vii) Reserve Force and Cadets

Discussion

The Reserve Force has retained its navy, army and air affiliations. The Communication Reserve was split from the Militia and is an extension of Communication Command.

The role of the Militia is individual and limited sub-unit augmentation of the Regular Force. Unit establishments, equipment scales and support have a limited relationship to augmentation. Low priority resource allocation has constrained unit establishments and scales. In addition, the role does not adequately support unit training, unit administration, the regimental system or sense of purpose in the community. The scope of assistance is greater for units supported by Mobile Command bases.

The Naval Reserve has a clear role and is organized and trained to meet it. There is some difficulty in obtaining adequate response to its specific administrative and logistic needs because so many units are supported by bases of other commands. The Canadian Forces uniform cloaks its naval identity in the community, making development of unit and service pride more difficult and possibly reducing community support.

The Air Reserve augments Regular Force squadrons in operations. In some instances it appears to be an air auxiliary and there is a requirement to examine the regulations, pay and support that are applied to the Air Reserve in these cases.

The Communication Reserve is effective, as it is completely integrated into Communication Command. The secondary role of field communications in support of the Militia is being addressed.

The common cadet uniform hides identification of the three cadet services and inhibits the development of community support and unit pride.

Conclusions

Particularly for the Militia and Air Reserve, there are inadequacies in the areas of role definition, funding, equipment, manning and opportunities for training.

The cadet services have suffered from a loss of environmental identity.

A number of concerns with respect to the Reserve Force have been brought to the attention of the Task Force, some of which have been addressed elsewhere in the report. The Task Force has not undertaken a complete review of these problems, but feels that they are sufficiently well founded to require consideration by the Government. They seem particularly valid for the Militia and to a lesser extent for the Air Reserve. These concerns relate specifically to:

- a. role definition;
- b. the provision of resources, including equipment and manning to match the roles assigned;
- c. adequate opportunity to train for these roles; and
- d. environmental identity.

viii) Command and Control

Discussion

It is the Task Force's view that command structure problems and organizational problems are intimately linked. In the actual situation, although careful attention is paid to the environmental backgrounds of senior appointments, the senior staff available to the Chief of the Defence Staff at National Defence Headquarters may be precluded by the nature of the system from being effective representatives of the navy, army and/or air force. They do not necessarily have experience in commanding a command and as they are in senior management appointments, they are not meant to think along environmental lines.

The major aspect of the problem of command and control focuses on the participation of the sea, land and air operations representatives in the decision making process. There was not a clear-cut command focus for all environments until after 1975 when Air Command was formed. The participation of the most senior environmental representatives has been virtually non-existent in the highest level decision making bodies - the Defence Management Committee and the Defence Council. The present structure of the decision making process at National Defence Headquarters relegates environmental input to the level of the Program Control Board Sub-Committee, and it is left to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff as chairman of the Program Control Board, the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff by virtue of the authorities and responsibilities of their positions to determine what will go forward to the Minister. If the Commanders of commands feel strongly about an issue concerning their environment, they do not have an official channel open to them to make their views known to the Minister. Their avenue of input is through the Chiefs of Maritime, Land and Air Doctrine and Operations, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, and finally to the Chief of the Defence Staff if indeed the Commanders are aware of the status of a submission. The incumbents of the environmental positions, the Chiefs of Maritime, Land and Air Doctrine and Operations, are not the most experienced representatives of their environments in that they have never commanded an environmental command. Also in practice the incumbents have been changed too frequently. Although they are expected to represent the views of the environmental commands, the only formal provision for this representation is in resource commitment planning through the Program Control Board Sub-Committee, and this can only occur if the issue being addressed has been reviewed previously with the Commanders.

It is debatable whether or not greater representation of the environment at senior levels of management at National Defence Headquarters would have led to a more balanced system of management in terms of the requirements of each of the environments. But at the perceptual level, particularly from outside National Defence Headquarters, there is no doubt that the environmental representation is not clearly visible. From that perspective, the navy, army and air force are not seen to be represented within the National Defence Headquarters decision making process. Many frustrations flow from the perceived lack of action being taken on known problems which bear upon operational effectiveness and whose dimensions extend outside the Program Control Board scope of activities.

These problems are reviewed elsewhere in this section, and include the lack of environmental training, distortions in the common rank structure, inadequate field support for operational units, inadequacies in the base concept, inadequate mobilization planning and environmental identity for personnel. Although various studies have analysed and reported on most of these problems, little in the way of corrective action has been taken.

The Task Force considers that there is insufficient environmental influence on these vital matters at National Defence Headquarters. It is to be noted that the Armed Forces Council wherein the Commanders may make their views known to the Chief of the Defence Staff meets infrequently and fails to satisfy this need. Moreover, the Commanders of Commands and the Chiefs of Doctrine and Operations now have only limited influence on personnel, training and materiel systems.

Another aspect of the command and control problem can best be described as a blurred chain of command in the sense that there are too many sources and channels of direction from National Defence Headquarters to units and bases. Although in theory direction is from and on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff, this emanates, in practice, from different command and staff organizations and is not sufficiently coordinated. Therefore it has a disruptive effect on the functioning of commands, operational units and bases. The situation now exists where, for example, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) may issue directions to bases affecting personnel in units attached to the base and the parent command of those units is by-passed. The unit commanding officer must go through his command if he wishes to appeal these directions on the grounds that they may not be in the best interests of his unit. The problems are magnified when it is considered that this procedure may be followed in matters relating to training, the Reserve Force, conditions of service, base support and regional functions.

Within the area of command and control, there is a perception that civilians have too much influence in the making of decisions which affect the military. In part, this perception may be based on an incomplete understanding by those in the field about the nature and functioning of National Defence Headquarters, and in part, attributable to the composition of the Defence Management Committee which is perceived to be dominated by civilians. The Task Force feels that the relationships between civilian and military personnel are of a high quality. It is also felt that the perception of civilianization would be dissipated with a greater involvement of the military in the decision making process.

Conclusions

There is a lack of environmental input into the decision making process at the senior National Defence Headquarters level.

There are too many sources of direction to the commands, bases and units.

There is a lack of environmental direction to the National Defence Headquarters central systems.

Recommendations

The Task Force, in making the following recommendations wishes to retain the integrated systems currently in use in National Defence Headquarters, but at the same time, wants to ensure that these systems respond to the needs of the three environments.

20. The Task Force recommends as an urgent priority that the Commanders of Commands be made members of the Defence Council and the Defence Management Committee and that measures be taken to ensure their influence is fully recognized in matters pertaining to operations, training, personnel administration and support to the operational forces.

21. If this measure proves insufficient to solve the problems identified by the Task Force, it is further recommended that three environmental Heads of Service be established at National Defence Headquarters to be responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff for the command of the navy, army and air force.

These recommendations are made bearing in mind the principle that any modification should take place in an evolutionary manner.

ix) Identity

Discussion

Probably the most controversial aspect of unification was the common green uniform and other symbols associated with identity which disappeared with unification. Although there is loyalty to the Canadian Forces as a whole, the need to identify with something smaller is evident from the evolutionary modifications to identity which have happened during the past ten years.

From an operational point of view, the dividing lines among navy, army and air force have not disappeared. There remains an individual and personal pride in living, working and fighting in each of the three environments and in the professionalism required to do so. The skills to be acquired, which increase with experience, are different in the three environments and personal preference for any one of the three is based upon these differences. The various changes which have been made within the system also point towards a greater recognition of the differences among environments.

The army has been persistent in its efforts to satisfy the desire for distinctive identity within its ranks and has achieved this down to the unit level. The personnel who support army units in operations have not achieved this goal and there is a perceived need for them to do so. Although the navy and air force do not place such a high priority on unit (ship or squadron) identity, they see identity with the environmental force as paramount.

Some recognition has been given to the desire for distinctive identity in working dress - on ships, on bases and in units.

Naval personnel at all levels are particularly vocal concerning their need for environmental identity and for their desire to use naval rank nomenclature not only on ships, but throughout the Canadian Forces.

There is another aspect of identity that should be considered - the Canadian public's view of the forces today.

Better identification of the Canadian Forces, that is to say an easy public recognition of whether a serving member is a sailor, a soldier or an airman, may help the Canadian public in taking a renewed pride in the activities carried on by the Canadian Forces on sea, land and air. With the exception of the army, it is not considered that further distinctive identity can be achieved by means of insignia attached to the green uniform.

The foregoing also applies to cadets and the Reserve Force, units of which used to be an integral part of the community and which have experienced a reduction in community interest and support.

The cost implications of providing greater identity through distinctive uniforms cannot be established with certainty, but seem to be small compared to the advantage which would accrue to the Canadian Forces.

Conclusions

Although the common green uniform may have contributed to a better understanding of some of the problems within the Canadian Forces, it does not meet the need for further identity.

If given the choice, all three environments would insist on a separate environmental identity. The army's requirements for identity have been met to a great extent with the changes that have been made to the green uniform. Naval personnel have a need for further naval identity through a dark blue uniform. Air force personnel to a lesser degree require increased environmental identity.

Support service personnel also need increased identity to a varying degree. Whether or not they be considered as a fourth force, attached to one of the three environments, or be divided among the three services, constitutes a problem, the implications of which the Task Force is unable to fully assess.

In all cases, there is a requirement for identity at the unit, ship or squadron level and there is a requirement across the Canadian Forces for increased trade identification. There is a need to recognize throughout the Canadian Forces the rank nomenclature for naval personnel. There is a need for rank insignia throughout the Canadian Forces to be identifiable on an environmental basis, except for some classifications such as chaplains and legal.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

22. further identification be provided in the Canadian Forces for environment, ship, squadron or unit
23. trade badges be authorized
24. rank nomenclature for naval personnel be recognized throughout the Canadian Forces

The Task Force recognizes that the introduction of separate uniforms for the navy, the army and the air force has been the subject in the past of serious discussions at some of the senior management levels of the department. Without prejudicing judgements made in the past, the Task Force feels that the problem should be reconsidered in light of the following recommendations:

25. the army retain the green uniform
26. naval personnel be allowed to select and wear a dark blue walking out uniform as soon as possible
27. air force personnel be allowed to select and wear a light blue uniform

28. any uniform modification take into account the overriding principle that uniforms be distinctively Canadian
29. the need for further support services identity be the subject of further study
30. any retention of the green uniform, in the context of recommendations above, include a complete, rationalized system of identification by environment, unit, rank and trade to be developed and applied by the Department of National Defence in a controlled manner

D. CONCLUSION ON OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

The Task Force's assessment of its mandate included an overview of the effectiveness of the Canadian Forces for operations today. Operational effectiveness has been a preoccupation of the Task Force in examining the unified structure and a review of the recommendations will confirm this as the primary concern.

The record of performance of the Canadian Forces in meeting challenges has been high. Today, the army and air contingents in Canadian Forces Europe are considered highly professional, and according to NATO standards, they perform extremely well. Similarly, from a seamanship point of view the naval forces serving within NATO or Canada-United States exercises are rated as superior. The Canadian air personnel operating within NORAD are also of excellent quality.

Canadian contributions to United Nations peacekeeping, particularly in logistics and communications, are highly valued because our forces are well trained and well educated.

In Canada, the Canadian Forces which have participated in tasks relating to aid to the civil power have demonstrated a high level of organizational ability and discipline.

In their assistance to civil authorities, the Canadian Forces have shown excellent capability for planning and for managing complex organizations. Examples include the Commonwealth Games, the Pan American Games, support to the 1976 Olympics, and a number of national winter and summer games. Other examples are search and rescue operations, oil spills, fighting forest fires, flood control, recovery of the USSR satellite fragments in the North, and in northern airfield and bridge construction.

The performance of all those activities indicates a disciplined, well administered force, capable of fielding excellent operational units and formations.

If operational effectiveness is interpreted in a wider context, however, the Canadian Forces have shortcomings.

Equipment

Apart from four DDH280-class ships, the navy is using obsolescent to obsolete vessels, with outdated and limited electronics and weapons systems.

The CF101 and CF104 front line aircraft used by the air force are obsolescent and increasingly expensive to maintain at operational levels.

Army equipment varies from new and current to obsolete. New tanks have been purchased for Canadian Forces Europe and school training in Canada. Artillery and radios have been upgraded to some extent. Small arms, trucks and many other smaller equipments are obsolescent. Militia equipment is in very poor condition and very limited in quantity.

Personnel

The peacetime establishments have been limited to a minimum and are held at 90 percent or lower in terms of manning. The army field formations in Canada, for example, would require approximately 5,000 to 6,000 men for operations, but are manned at about 3,500. All organizations in the Canadian Forces have been trimmed to the point where losses due to manning the United Nations forces, carrying large numbers of support trainees in units, and detachments to courses, result in dislocations throughout the system.

Materiel Resources

Resource constraints have dictated economies in fuel and consumable items such as food and ammunition, thereby curtailing the amount and quality of operational training.

Summary

If operational effectiveness means the ability of the Canadian Forces to fulfill the tasks that they have undertaken to date, they have performed in a highly efficient manner. If on the other hand, operational effectiveness is interpreted in its wider context, there remain serious deficiencies within the system which should be corrected.

Morale is reasonably high, despite the expressed concern from members of the Canadian Forces about the problems outlined earlier in this report: the lack of modern equipment, the insufficient manpower and resources, and a feeling of lack of support from the Government and the Canadian public.

GUIDELINE FOR SUBMISSION

The following is intended to be a general guideline for the preparation of briefs and submissions to the Task Force on the review of merits and disadvantages of unification of the Canadian Armed Forces. There is no intention to inhibit the scope of any submission; additional comments and points are encouraged.

At the outset of a submission it would be appreciated if the background of the individual or organization preparing the submission could be included. This is intended to provide the reader with an indication of both background and interest. Such things as former military service, date of retirement, rank level on retirement, and nature of employment would be included in this section.

A brief to the Task Force should include views in the following areas:

- Your understanding of what the goals of unification were at the time of unification; that is, why did Canada unify its Armed Forces?
- What were/are the advantages of unification?
- What were/are the disadvantages of unification?
- Any comments which you may have on the following areas:
 - Morale of the Forces
 - Training within the Forces
 - Recruitment for the Forces
 - Support to the operational component of the Forces, such as communication and supply
 - Effectiveness of the operational component of the Forces
 - Your views as to whether unification has impeded or enhanced the Canadian Armed Forces in meeting their objectives.

As indicated above, any further points that you consider significant should also be included.

MEETINGS OF THE TASK FORCE

In addition to its private working sessions, the Task Force met with the following groups and individuals. Public hearings are shown as (P).

September 14, 1979, Ottawa	Admiral R.H. Falls, CMM, CD Chief of the Defence Staff
September 18, 1979, Ottawa	Major-General D.G. Loomis, MC, OMM, CD Chief of Program
September 24-28, 1979, Ottawa	Mr. C.R. Nixon Deputy Minister, National Defence
	Lieutenant-General R.M. Withers, CMM, CD Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff
	Lieutenant-General G.C.E. Thériault, CMM, CD Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
	Mr. J.F. Anderson Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), National Defence
	Major-General C.H. Belzile, CMM, CD Chief of Land Doctrine and Operations
	Mr. L.G. Crutchlow Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), National Defence
	Mr. L.E. Davies Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance), National Defence
	Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) J.I. Davies, CMM, CD
	Major-General E.B. Creber, CD Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)
	Major-General J.B. Tucker, CD Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) and Chief of Financial Services

October 1-5, 1979, Ottawa

Major-General R.H. Rohmer,
CMM, DFC, CD, QC
Chief of Reserves

Brigadier-General L. Farrington, CD
Director General Information

Mr. A. de W. Mathewson
Chief of Policy Planning, National
Defence

Major-General H.A. Carswell, CD
Chief of Personnel Careers and Senior
Appointments

Lieutenant-General J.C. Smith, CMM, CD
Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel)

Rear-Admiral R.D. Yanow, CD
Chief of Maritime Doctrine and
Operations

Dr. G.R. Lindsey
Chief of Operational Research and
Analysis, National Defence

Major-General J.A. St-Aubin, OMM, CD
Chief of Personnel Development

Major-General N.S. Freeman, CD
Chief of Construction and Properties

Brigadier-General C.J. Gauthier, CD
Director General Departmental
Administrative Services

Major-General D.C. MacKenzie, CD
Chief of Air Doctrine and Operations

Commodore J. Rodocanachi, CD
Director General Intelligence and
Security

Brigadier-General V.A. McPherson, CD
Deputy Surgeon General

Brigadier-General J.P. Wolfe, CD
Judge Advocate General

Major-General R.N. Senior, CD
Chief of Engineering and Maintenance

Major-General D.G. Loomis, MC, OMM, CD

Admiral R.H. Falls, CMM, CD

Mr. W.R. Green
Associate Assistant Deputy Minister
(Personnel), National Defence

Brigadier-General M.L.A. Weisman, CD
Director General Policy Planning

Mr. G.A. White
Director General Personnel Coordination,
National Defence

Commodore G.L. Edwards, CD
Director General Military Plans and
Operations

Major-General D.G. Loomis, MC, OMM, CD

October 9, 1979,
Canadian Forces Base Borden,
Ontario

Commodore W.B. Hotsenpiller, OMM, CD
Base Commander, school commandants,
senior officers and a representative
group of Chief Warrant Officers

October 10, 1979,
Canadian Forces Base Toronto

Colonel I.H. Firth, CD
Base Commander, unit commanding
officers, senior officers and a
representative group of Sergeants and
Warrant Officers

October 10, 1979,
Canadian Forces College Toronto

Brigadier-General C.G. Kitchen, CD
Commandant, senior officers from the
Canadian Forces Staff College and
Staff School, and the student body of
the Canadian Forces Staff College

October 11, 1979,
Canadian Forces Base Trenton,
Ontario

Colonel R.D. Russell, CD
Base Commander

Brigadier-General B.A. Oxholm, CD
Commandant, Canadian Forces Training
System

Brigadier-General L. Skaalen, CD
Commander, Air Transport Group

	Base and formation senior officers, and a representative group of Warrant Officers
October 15-16, 1979, Maritime Command Headquarters, Halifax and Canadian Forces Base Halifax	Vice-Admiral J. Allan, CMM, CD Commander, Maritime Command, Command general officers and senior officers, school commandants, Base Commander, unit commanding officers and all ranks representatives
October 16, 1979, Halifax	Brigadier-General J.E. Ready Commander, Militia Area Atlantic and senior officers
October 17, 1979, Canadian Forces Base Greenwood, Nova Scotia	Lieutenant-Colonel G.K. Wright, CD Acting Base Commander, senior officers, unit commanding officers, representative groups of junior officers and other ranks from Corporal through Chief Warrant Officer
October 18, 1979, Canadian Forces Base Cornwallis, Nova Scotia	Colonel A.E. Fox, CD Base Commander, senior officers, representative groups of junior officers and other ranks from Corporal through Chief Warrant Officer
October 22, 1979, Air Command Headquarters and Canadian Forces Base Winnipeg	Lieutenant-General G.A. MacKenzie, CMM, CD Commander Air Command, Command general officers and senior officers, Base Commander, school and unit commanding officers, representative groups of junior officers and other ranks from Corporal through Chief Warrant Officer
October 23, 1979, Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake, Alberta	Colonel L.C. Price, CD Base Commander, unit commanding officers, senior officers, representative groups of junior officers and other ranks from Corporal through Chief Warrant Officer
October 24, 1979, Canadian Forces Base Calgary	Brigadier-General P.J. Mitchell, CD Base Commander and Commander 1 Canadian Brigade Group, unit commanding officers, representative groups of junior officers and other ranks from Corporal through Chief Warrant Officer

<p>October 25, 1979, Headquarters Maritime Forces Pacific and Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt, Victoria</p>	<p>Rear-Admiral M.A. Martin, CD Commander, Maritime Forces Pacific, Base Commander, unit commanding officers, senior officers, representative groups of other ranks from Private/Ordinary Seaman through Chief Warrant Officer/ Chief Petty Officer First Class</p>
<p>October 26, 1979, Canadian Forces Base Chilliwack, British Columbia</p>	<p>Lieutenant-Colonel D.C.H. Francis, CD Deputy Base Commander, school commandants, unit commanding officers, senior officers, representative groups of junior officers, and other ranks from Sergeant to Chief Warrant Officer</p>
<p>November 2, 1979, Headquarters Canadian Forces Europe and Canadian Forces Base Lahr, Federal Republic of Germany</p>	<p>Major-General J.E. Hanna, CD Commander, Canadian Forces Europe</p> <p>Brigadier-General J.A. Fox, OMM, CD Commander, 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group</p> <p>Brigadier-General W.G. Paisley, CD Commander, 1 Canadian Air Group</p> <p>Base Commanders of Canadian Forces Bases Lahr and Baden, formation and base senior officers, representative groups of other ranks from Private through Chief Warrant Officer</p>
<p>November 5-6, 1979, Headquarters Canadian Forces Contingent, United Nations, Cyprus</p>	<p>Brigadier-General J.A. Cotter, CD Commander Canadian Contingent, unit commanding officers, senior officers, representative groups of junior officers, and representative groups of other ranks from Private through Chief Warrant Officer</p>
<p>November 8-9, 1979, NATO Headquarters and SHAPE, Belgium</p>	<p>Ambassador J.E.G. Hardy Permanent Representative and Ambassador, Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council</p> <p>Vice-Admiral J.A. Fulton, OMM, CD Canadian Military Representative to NATO</p> <p>Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) R. St.G. Stephens, CD (former Canadian Military Representative to NATO)</p>

	Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) D.A. Collins, CD (former Canadian Military Representative to NATO)
	General Sir Jack Harman, KCB, OBE, MC Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
	Senior Canadian Forces officers from London and Oslo
November 14, 1979, Headquarters Mobile Command and Canadian Forces Base Montreal	Lieutenant-General J.J. Paradis, CMM, CD Commander, Mobile Command, Command general officers and senior officers, Base Commander, unit commanding officers, representative groups of junior officers, and other ranks from Sergeant through Chief Warrant Officer
November 15, 1979, Canadian Forces Base Valcartier Québec	Brigadier-General F.J. Richard, CD Base Commander and Commander 5 Canadian Brigade Group, unit commanding officer, Base and formation senior officers, representative groups of Warrant Officers
November 20, 1979, Canadian Forces Base Kingston	Colonel A.C. Brown, CD Base Commander, School Commandant, Base and school senior officers, representative groups of other ranks from Sergeant through Chief Warrant Officer
	Rear-Admiral C.W. Ross, CD Commandant, National Defence College, two military students from the National Defence College
	Group discussion with the Commandant and Staff of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College
November 22-23, 1979, Ottawa	Colonel A.M. Bélanger, OMM, CD Director of Women Personnel
	Colonel J.A.R. Vandal, CD Director of Recruiting Services
	Chief Warrant Officer R.P.A. Osside, OMM, CD Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer

Major-General L.V. Johnson, CD
Associate Assistant Deputy Minister
(Policy) and Chief of Evaluation

Mr. J.R. Killick
Chief of Supply, National Defence

Mr. E.J. Bobyn
Chief of Research and Development,
National Defence

November 26, 1979, Ottawa

Major C.A. Cotton, CD
Royal Military College of Canada
(formerly of the Personnel Applied
Research Unit)

November 27, 1979, Headquarters
Canadian Forces Communication
Command, Ottawa

Brigadier-General D.P. Harrison, CD
Commander Communication Command, Command
senior officers and Command Chief
Warrant Officer

November 28, 1979, Ottawa

Major-General J.A. Gutknecht, CD
Deputy Commander, Mobile Command

Lieutenant-General J.J. Paradis, CMM, CD

November 29, 1979,
Canadian Forces Base Gagetown,
New Brunswick

Brigadier-General D.R. Baker, CD
Base Commander and Commandant Combat
Training Centre, Base and Centre
senior officers, unit commanding
officers, representative group of
other ranks from Private through
Master Corporal

December 3-5, 1979, Halifax

Colonel E.I. Patrick, CD
Base Commander, Canadian Forces Base
Shearwater, Deputy Base Commander,
unit commanding officers and deputies
from two Sea King helicopter squadrons

Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) D.W. Piers, DSC, CD

Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) H.A. Porter, CD

Mr. A.R.W. Lockhart

Commodore (Ret'd) B.S. Oland, CD

Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) D.S. Boyle,
CMM, CD

Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) W.M. Landymore,
OBE, CD

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) E.A.C. Amy,
DSO, OBE, MC, CD

Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) H.F. Pullen,
OBE, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) G.H. Spencer,
OBE, CD

(P) Military Affairs Committee
of the Halifax Board of Trade

(P) Royal Canadian Air Force Association,
Halifax Wing

(P) Canadian Forces Logistics Association

(P) Captain(N) (Ret'd) J.L. Cohrs, CD

(P) Group Captain (Ret'd) Boudoux

(P) Nova Scotia Naval Officers Association
(a branch of the Naval Officers
Associations of Canada)

December 6, 1979, Montreal

General (Ret'd) J.A. Dextraze,
CBE, CMM, DSO, CD
Chief of the Defence Staff, 1972-1977

General (Ret'd) J.V. Allard,
CC, CBE, DSO, CD
Chief of the Defence Staff, 1966-1969

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) G.A. Turcot,
CMM, CD

Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) J.C. O'Brien,
OC, CD

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) J. Chouinard,
CMM, CD

December 10-14, 1979, Toronto

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) H. Tellier,
DSO, CD

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) J. Gibbons, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) W.C. Leonard,
MBE, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) R.G. Husch, CD

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) D.A. McAlpine
CMM, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) J.C. Gardner, CD

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) J.T. West, CD

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) G.G. Bell,
MBE, CD

The Honourable Barnett J. Danson, P.C.
Minister of National Defence, 1976-1979

(P) Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies

(P) Canadian Defence Quarterly

(P) Monarchist League of Canada

(P) Professor R.B. Byers, York University

(P) Royal Canadian Armoured Corps
Association

(P) Royal Canadian Naval Association

(P) Mr. N.W. Emmott

(P) Colonel (Ret'd) H.W.C. Stethem, OBE, CD

(P) Major-General (Ret'd) B.W. Legge

(P) Mr. D.M. Campbell

(P) Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) M.A.
Stevenson, CD

(P) Mr. R.A. Zeidler

(P) Brigadier (Ret'd) R.S. Malone, OBE, ED

(P) Mr. Nicholas Stethem

December 17-20, 1979, Ottawa

Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) S.M. Davis, CD

Mr. E.P. Black
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) A.C. Hull,
CMM, DFC, CD

Air Commodore (Ret'd) C.W. Burgess,
DFC, CD

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) H.C. Wenz, CD

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) C.L. Kirby,
CD

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) F.W. Wootton,
CD

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) C.R.H.
Charlebois, CD

Commodore (Ret'd) G.M. Derosenroll, CD

General (Ret'd) F.R. Sharp, DFC, CD
Chief of the Defence Staff, 1969-1972

The Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, P.C.
Minister of National Defence, 1963-1967

Major-General (Ret'd) M.T. Freidl, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) J.P.R. Larose, CD

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) K.R.
Greenaway, CD

January 3-4, 1980, Ottawa

Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) S.E. Paddon, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) L.C. Morrison, CD

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) W.A. Milroy,
DSO, CD

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) R.C. Stovel,
AFC, CD

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) H. McLachlan,
CMM, DFC, CD

Air Vice Marshal (Ret'd) M.P. Martyn, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) G.F. Ockenden,
DFC, CD

Air Marshal (Ret'd) E.M. Reyno, AFC, CD

		Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) R.W. Moncel, DSO, OBE, CD
		Royal Canadian Air Force Pre-War Club of Canada
January 7, 1980, Ottawa		Brigadier-General J.J.A. Doucet, OMM, CD
January 8-10, 1980, Calgary	(P)	Air Reserve Association
		Mr. F.P. Mannix
		Major-General (Ret'd) G.G. Brown, CD
	(P)	Petty Officer (Ret'd) W.E. Kolachynski, CD
	(P)	Mr. J.R.W. Sykes
	(P)	Mr. G.P. Fisher
January 11, 1980, Ottawa		Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Poulter, CD Directorate of Personnel Careers Officers
		Chief Warrant Officer W.E. Sandy, CD Directorate of Personnel Careers Other Ranks
January 14-18, 1980, Ottawa	(P)	Defence Medical Association
	(P)	Canadian Infantry Association
	(P)	Chief Warrant Officer (Ret'd) T.R. Yaeger, MMM, CD
	(P)	Mr. D.I. Shade
	(P)	Land Ordnance Engineering Association
	(P)	Royal Canadian Air Force Association
	(P)	Royal Canadian Military Institute
	(P)	Maritime Defence Association of Canada
	(P)	Royal Canadian Legion
	(P)	Mr. J.A. Sheltus
	(P)	Navy League of Canada

(P) Naval Officers Associations of Canada

(P) Air Cadet League of Canada

Vice-Admiral J. Allan, CMM, CD

Lieutenant-General J.J. Paradis, CMM, CD

Lieutenant-General G.A. MacKenzie,
OMM, CD

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) D.A.G.
Waldock, CD

Commodore (Res) T. Smith, CD

Doctor G.S. Smith
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs

January 21-22, 1980, Vancouver

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) H.B. Brodie,
MBE, CD

Commodore (Ret'd) B.B. Morrow, CD

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) D.R. Adamson,
CD

(P) Colonel (Ret'd) D.F. Spankie, OBE, ED

(P) Conference of Defence Associations

(P) Honourary Officers' Association of
British Columbia

(P) Military Engineers Association of Canada

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) J. Cardy,
MC, CD

January 23-25, 1980, Victoria

Lieutenant-General K.E. Lewis, CMM, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) J.M. Rockingham,
CB, CBE, DSO, ED, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) G. Kitching, CD

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) R.J. Lane,
DSO, DFC, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) G.J.J. Edwards,
DFC, CD

Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) R.W. Murdoch, CD

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) D.S. Nicholson
MBE, CD

(P) Federation of Military and United
Services Institutes of Canada

(P) Canadian Forces Communications and
Electronics Association

(P) Captain (Ret'd) F.O. Willmore, MM, CD

(P) Naval Officers Association of Vancouver
Island

(P) Board of Regimental Trustees to the
Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess
Mary's)

Major-General (Ret'd) L.H. Wylie, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) W.H. Vincent,
CMM, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) N.H. Ross,
DSO, CD

Major-General (Ret'd) A.J. Tedlie,
DSO, CD

Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) T.B. McLean, CD

January 29-30, 1980, Ottawa

Mr. T.G. Morry
Director General, Appeals and
Investigations Branch, Public Service
Commission

Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) R.P. Welland,
DSC, CD

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) R.T. Bennett,
OBE, CD

Mr. D.R. Hansen

The Honourable Donald S. MacDonald, P.C.
Minister of National Defence, 1970-1972

	Major-General (Ret'd) J.W.B. Barr, CMM, CD
	Brigadier-General (Ret'd) S.V. Radley-Walters, CMM, DSO, MC, CD
	Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) T.S. Allan, CD
	Brigadier-General (Ret'd) C.S. Gilliatt, DFC, CD
	Air Commodore (Ret'd) G.G. Diamond, DFC, CD
	Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) R.H. Roberts, CD
February 7, 1980, Ottawa	Admiral R.H. Falls, CMM, CD
February 8, 1980, Ottawa	Lieutenant-Colonel D.P. Burke United States Air Force
February 19, 1980, Ottawa	Mr. C.R. Nixon

DATA: GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALSSUMMARY OF TASK FORCE MEETINGS BY GROUPS


	<u>Individuals Seen</u>
<u>Group 1</u> - National Defence Headquarters	10
<u>NOTE:</u> Civilians only; all Canadian Forces members included in Group 2 for statistical purposes.	
<u>Group 2</u> - Canadian Forces Members	932
<u>NOTE:</u> See Appendices 1 & 2 for breakout.	
<u>Group 3</u> - Retired General Officers	68
<u>Group 4</u> - Specifically Invited Individuals	10
<u>Group 5</u> - 28 Defence-related Associations were represented by 68 individuals	68
<u>NOTE:</u> These 28 associations represent a membership of over 600,000 people.	
<u>Group 6</u> - Public at Large	22
<u>GRAND TOTAL OF INDIVIDUALS WHO APPEARED BEFORE THE TASK FORCE</u>	1110

CANADIAN FORCES MEMBERS SEENBY LOCATIONS

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>OTHER RANKS</u>	<u>TOTALS SEEN</u>
BORDEN	11	13	24
BRUSSELS	7	-	7
CALGARY	21	22	43
CHILLIWACK	19	10	29
COLD LAKE	11	30	41
CORNWALLIS	16	15	31
CYPRUS	21	52	73
GAGETOWN	15	20	35
GREENWOOD	15	10	25
HALIFAX	66	41	107
VALCARTIER	6	10	16
KINGSTON	34	12	46
LAHR	14	24	38
MONTREAL	93	8	101
OTTAWA	36	2	38
TORONTO	109	12	121
TRENTON	30	14	44
VICTORIA	16	42	58
WINNIPEG	35	20	55
<u>TOTALS SEEN</u>	575	357	932


CANADIAN FORCES MEMBERS SEENBY RANK AND SERVICE


<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>SUPPORT</u>	<u>TOTALS SEEN</u>	<u>CANADIAN FORCES STRENGTH 10 OCT 79</u>
GENERAL	1	-	-	-	1	1
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL	2	3	2	1	8	8
MAJOR-GENERAL	4	6	5	1	16	20
BRIGADIER-GENERAL	6	13	8	4	31	72
COLONEL	13	29	32	5	79	320
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL	25	42	21	19	107	918
MAJOR	37	72	53	18	180	2915
CAPTAIN	16	35	17	14	82	6279
LIEUTENANT	19	23	15	8	65	1860
2ND LIEUTENANT	1	2	3	-	6	2722
<u>TOTALS SEEN (OFFICERS)</u>	124	225	156	70	575	-
<u>CANADIAN FORCES TOTALS (OFFICERS)</u>	1789	1978	4910	6478	-	15115
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER	20	15	10	14	59	800
MASTER WARRANT OFFICER	10	20	11	12	53	2089
WARRANT OFFICER	9	23	11	12	55	4235
SERGEANT	9	15	11	23	58	9852
MASTER CORPORAL	10	13	7	19	49	11075
CORPORAL	13	15	6	14	48	14430
PRIVATE	21	10	2	2	35	20892
<u>TOTALS SEEN (OTHER RANKS)</u>	92	111	58	96	357	-
<u>CANADIAN FORCES STRENGTH (OTHER RANKS)</u>	6971	9654	12347	34401	-	63373
<u>GRAND TOTALS SEEN</u>	216	336	214	166	932	-
<u>CANADIAN FORCES TOTAL STRENGTH</u>	8760	11632	17257	4083	-	78488





DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ORGANIZATION 1968





CONSULTANT'S STATEMENT

Apt. 803,
4005 Bayview Avenue,
Willowdale, Ontario.
M2M 3Z9

March 10, 1980.

Mr. G.M. Fyffe,
Chairman,
Task Force on Review of
Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces,
Postal Station "D",
P.O. Box 2600,
Ottawa, Ontario.
K1P 5W6


Dear Mr. Fyffe:

This will acknowledge that I was given every opportunity to participate fully in all the hearings, discussions and other activities of the Task Force.

I am very grateful for the cooperation and assistance that I received from you, the other members of the Task Force and all the very fine support personnel.

This will confirm that I am in complete agreement with the conclusions and recommendations of the report.

Yours sincerely,


R.F. Herbert,
Consultant to the
Task Force.

STAFF OF THE TASK FORCE

W.M. Ritchie	Executive Secretary
J.F. Webster	Director of Operations
J.S. Dunn	Director of Administration
R.R. Dooner	Administrative Assistant
D.J. Beattie	Research Officer
R.L. Raymont	Research Officer
G.H. Whelan	Office Manager
G. Brayman	Office Staff
D. Dalpé	Office Staff
V. Gagné	Office Staff
Y. Landry	Office Staff
V. Lightsey	Office Staff
C. Ludlow	Office Staff
I. Miller	Office Staff
A. Turgeon	Office Staff

